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PREFACE 
This thesis is an examination of the various factors that prevented 
the Lamar administration from obtaining a loan from British financial 
interests. The study examines these factors in two ways. First, the 
pressures on British foreign policy, both internal and external, that 
prevented the British Government from recognizing the Republic of Texas 
as an independent nation~ Recognition was needed by the Republic of 
Texas before its securities could become negotiable on the British money 
markets. The internal pressures came from the anti-slavery element in 
parliament, and the merchants and investors concerned with foreign trade 
and investments~ The external pressures involved British foreign 
policy, particularly in the Caribbean region. Second, the attempts of 
the Lamar administration to procure the loan and its attempts to obtain 
recognition from the Mexican Government, which, if successful, would 
have also gained the Republic of Texas recognition from the British 
Government. 
The source material used in writing this study includes Texas 
Diplomatic Correspondence, Texas Treasury Papers, and the Papers of 
Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar as the major primary sources, along with 
numerous secondary sources dealing with Lamar and the Republic of Texas. 
I would like to express my thanks to several members of the History 
Department for their assistance and guidance: Dr. Odie B. Faulk, my 
adviser, whose advice and untiring patience brought this study to a 
successful conclusion; Dr. Joseph A. Stout, for his assistance as my 
second reader; and Dr~ Homer L. Knight, former head of the department, 
without whose counsel and encouragement my graduate studies would have 
never been completed. 
In addition, I owe a great debt to the staff of the Oklahoma State 
Library for their prompt and willing help, particularly for the many 
hours devoted to procuring inter-library loans necessary for. this study. 
Also, my family deserve a great deal of credit for my having com-
pleted this study~ Once again my son and my daughter will have a 
father. 
Despite the best efforts of all these people, there may be numerous 
errors in this thesis. Any mistakes which have been made are mine alone 
and I accept full responsibility for them. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of Texas was in deep financial trouble when its second 
president, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, took office on December 9, 1838. 
Government expenditures were exceeding revenue, an unfavorable balance 
of trade existed, there was little money in the Republic 1 s treasuryi and 
the value of Texas money was fast depreciating. Nearly everyone in 
Texas believed the only satisfactory solution to the Republic's finan-
cial dilemma was a loan from foreign financial circles. The Texas 
Congress had authorized negotiations for such a loan in November, 1836. 
Loan commissioners were appointed by President Houston and sent to the 
United States, soon after the United States recognized the Republic of 
Texas on March 3 1 1837, in an attempt to negotiate a loan at one of the 
major money markets but no progress had been made~ Lamar optimistically 
continued the negotiations and at the same time embarked on an expan-· 
sionist program that staked the success of his administration, and 
possibly that of the Republic, on obtaining a loan. 
The loan negotiations continued to drag on with only promises, as 
the effect of the financial panic of 1837 began' to be fully felt in the 
United States, causing Lamar to turn his attention toward the major 
money markets of Europe for a loan. British financial circles were high 
on Lamar 1 s list as he directed the loan commissioners to exert every 
possible effort to obtain a loan immediately, for time as well as money 
was a factor. Lamar 1 s ambitious plans for the Republic of Texas called 
for large amounts of money, and the Republic's treasury was nearly 
empty. 
2 
Throughout the first year of Lamar's administration, there was high 
hope that the long-sought loan 1 needed to correct the Republic's finan-
cial difficulties, would soon be forthcoming. Furthermore 1 there was a 
good possibility the loan could have been arranged in 1839. Financiers 
in London were ready to make the loan, but were prevented from doing so 
because the Republic of Texas had not been recognized as an independent 
nation by the British Government. Normally, the British Government used 
as its criteria for recognizing a nation three factors: land, popula-
tion, and control of the land and population. In the case of the 
Republic of Texas, these factors were complicated by pressures on 
British foreign policy, both external and internal. The external pres-
sures were associated with British foreign relations with Mexico, 
France, and the United States, while the internal pressures came from 
the opponents of slavery and those persons and businesses involved in 
foreign trade and finance. It was the inability of Lamar and his admin-
istration to cope with these pressures on British foreign policy in 
relation to the Republic of Texas that was primarily responsible for the 
failure to obtain a loan from British financial circles. 
Beyond the fact that Lamar had served for a time in the cabinet of 
the interim government and later as the first Vice President of the 
Republic of Texas 1 there was little else in his background or past 
experiences to prepare him for being a head of state. Lamar was born 
August 16, 1798, the second of nine children, near the Georgia frontier 
town of Louisville •. His formal education was limited to local schools 
3 
and to some tutors from whom he developed a passion for reading, par-
ticularly history. Yet in 1819, he chose to enter the mercantile busi-
ness in Cahawba, Alabama, in preference to attending Princeton. The 
business venture was unsuccessful as was a newspaper business two years 
later. Needing to recover his losses, Lamar returned to Georgia. 1 
Politics intrigued Lamar. In 1823, he supported George M. Troup in 
the Georgia gubernatorial campaign and was rewarded for his support by 
becoming the Governor's private secretary after Troup won the election. 
When his term as secretary to the governor expired, Lamar married Miss 
Tibitha B. Jordan of Perry, Alabama and retired to the farm in 1826, but 
not from politics. In 1829, he ran for the Georgia State Senate on a 
platform of states' rights and hostility to the Indians, but withdrew 
when his wife died of tuberculosis. Recovering from this tragedy, Lamar 
campaigned unsuccessfully for the United States House of Representatives 
in 1833. The following summer another tragedy, the suicide of his 
favorite brother Lucius, prompted Lamar to withdraw from all public 
2 
activities and to seek comfort in travel. 
Recalling the vivid accounts of Texas by his good friend James W. 
Fannin, Lamar traveled to Texas. He arrived in the middle of June, 
1835, and like many other young men of his time, fell in love with Texas 
and the people who lived there. The investment possibilities offered by 
Texas land excited Lamar, and he decided to make this his home. Return-
ing to Georgia, Lamar closed out his affairs and hurried back to Texas, 
1 Stanley Siegel, A Political History of the Texas Republic 1836-
18~5 (Austini 1956), pp. 100-102; Asa Kyrus Christian, Mirabeau 
Buonaparte Lamar (Austin, 1922), PP• 3rn5. 
2Ibid. 
arriving on the eve of the Battle of San Jacinto. In a daring display 
of horsemanship the following day, Lamar rescued the Secretary of War 
of the Interim Government, Thomas J. Rusk, and was thus rewarded with 
the rank of Major. That same night, Lamar's cavalry unit held an elec-
3 tion and voted him the rank of Colonel. 
Because of Lamar's popularity, Interim President David G. Burnet 
asked him to join the cabinet, replacing Rusk who was returning to the 
army. Using the cabinet position effectively, Lamar campaigned for and 
won the office of vice president in the election that fall. On October 
22, 1836, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar took the vice presidential oath of 
office, shortly after Sam Houston had been sworn in as the first presi-
dent of the Republic of Texas. In five short months, Lamar had risen 
from a private in the cavalry to Vice President of the Republic.~ 
The Constitution of the Republic of Texas prohibited the president 
from succeeding himself. This Constitution also limited the presiden-
tial term to two years, with subsequent presidents having three-year 
terms. Lamar was one of four candidates for the office of president in 
1838. Two candidates, Peter W. Grayson and James Collingsworth, died 
before the election. Grayson was killed at Bean's Station in Tennessee, 
and Collingsworth jumped off a steamer into Galveston Bay and drowned. 
Lamar won the election defeating the remaining candidate, Robert Wilson, 
3Herbert Gambrell, Anson Jones: 
(Austin, 196~), P• 69. 
The Last President of Texas 
----- --
~Jim Dan Hill, The Texas Navy in Forgotten Battles .ill!£ Shirtsleeve 
Diplomacy (Chicago, 1937), p. 106. 
by a vote of 6,995 to 252 and on December 9, 183~ was sworn in as the 
second president of the Republic of Texas. 5 
The public debt stood at $1,886,425 when Lamar took office and 
rose rapidly throughout his administration reaching $7,446,740 by the. 
end of his presidency. 6 He inherited a nearly empty treasury and what 
money there was disappeared quickly to meet existing obligations. The 
5 
Republic was already printing paper money, with $684,069 -- worth eighty 
cents on the dollar -- in circulation. Hoping to increase the money 
supplY, Houston's administration had authorized the printing of $500,000 
in Promissory Notes in 1837. The notes were to run for one year, with 
interest set at ten per cent. The notes were so successful that the 
following year the Texas Congress authorized their re-issuance, and to 
increase the money supply still more, an additional issue of one million 
dollars in new notes; both issues to run indefinitely. President 
Houston had vetoed the new issue only to have Congress override his 
veto. 7 He was, however, able to hold down the amount of new notes 
printed, but Lamar, as soon as he became president, allowed the printing 
presses to run unchecked. From January to September, 1839, additional 
notes amounting to $1,569,010 were printed, with yet another $1,983,790 
5Hubert H. Bancroft, History~~ North Mexican States and Texas 
(San Francisco, 1889), XVI, P• 313. 
6 Edmund T. Miller,!::._ Financial History~ Texas (Austin, 1916), 
P• 391° 
7Herbert T. Hoover, "Ashbel Smith on Currency and Finance in the 
Republic of Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LXXXI (January, 
1968), pp. 420-421. 
6 
in notes printed the following year. 8 This action rapidly increased the 
amount of money in circulation and, at the same time, just as rapidly 
depreciated the value of Texas money. By the end of Lamar's adminis-
tration, Texas money, which had been worth eighty cents on the dollar at 
the beginning of his term, would be nearly valueless outside of Texas 
and worth no more than twelve to fifteen cents on the dollar in most 
areas of the Republic. 9 
The First and Second Texas Congresses had expected revenue from 
direct taxes, custom duties, the sale of public land, and land dues 
would be sufficient to meet the expenditures of the Republic, but that 
was not the case. The deficit spending of all previous congresses added 
to the financial crisis Lamar inherited. Expenditures authorized by 
Congress during the years 1836 through 1838 exceeded revenue by 
10 $2,011,877. 
Revenue from direct taxes for the years 1836 through 1838 amounted 
to only $100,455. 11 The financial panic of 1837 in the United States 
sent a surge of immigrants to Texas, but they brought little money with 
them. The few possessions they brought were either untaxable or pro-
duced little revenue once those items required in the individual's 
trade, which were excluded from taxation by law, were deleted. 
Custom duties for the same period totaled $133,649, well below the 
8william M. Gouge. The Fiscal History£!. Texas; Embracing~ 
Account of its Revenue, Debts, and Currency, From the Commencement of 
the Revolution in 1834 to 1851-52 (Philadelphia, 1852), p. 268. 
9Asa Kyrus Christian, 11Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar,n Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, XXIII (April, 1920), p. 244. 
10Miller, A Financial History£!. Texas, p. 391. 
11Ibid. 
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amount the Texas Congress had anticipated.12 Congress had counted 
heavily on foreign trade to solve the Republic's financial woes and had 
not considered that Texas goods would have to compete with goods from 
the United States in the economically depressed European market. During 
the early years of the Republic, imports exceeded exports at a ratio 
f ~· t t h" h · t 13 rom ive- o-one o as ig as nine- o-one. Exports for the period 
September, 1835, to September, 1838, amounted to $183,323, while imports 
for the same period totaled $1,740,376, an imbalance in foreign trade 
that would continue throughout the Lamar administration. The first year 
of the Lamar administration alone imports exceeded exports by 
1~ $1,232,379. 
Land dues and the sale of public land for these same two years 
15 
would bring only $21,123 to the Republic's treasury. This was a great 
disappointment to those in office, for they had counted on the sale of 
public land as a major source of revenue. Nevertheless, it was the 
liberal land policy of those same office holders that prevented the sale 
of public land from being a major source of revenue. When the Republic 
was organized, the Government owned approximately one hundred eighty 
million acres of land. 16 The First Congress had donated land to the 
veterans of San Jacinto, to those at the siege of Bexar, to the families 
of the martyrs of Goliad, and to the, families of the defenders of the 
13 Gouge, The Fiscal History of Texas, p. 278. 
1
~Ibid, 
15Miller, A Financial History of Texas, p. 391. 
16Lewis W. Newton and Herb~rt P. Gambrell, Texas, Yesterday, and 
Today with~ Constitution (Dallas, 19~9), p. 160. 
Alamo. All volunteers in the revolutionary army received land on a 
basis of: three months service - 320 acres, six months service - 640 
17 
acres, and nine months or longer service - 1,280 acres. 
After taking care of the veterans of the revolutionary army and 
their families, the Texas Congress then turned its attention to those 
non-veterans residing in the Republic. In December, 1836, a law was 
passed granting all newcomers to Texas, who were heads of families, 
1,280 acres free, and all single men 640 acres, with both having the 
right to preempt additional acreage at fifty cents an acre. 18 
Immigrants continued to pour into the Republic of Texas, all seek-
ing one thing -- free land. The Third Congress responded to their 
wishes with a new land law on January 4, 1839, but at the same time 
reduced the amount of free land granted to each individual and also 
required the grantee to pay the cost of surveying and land office ex-
penses. Under this act, any free white male who was actually residing 
with his family in Texas and who had immigrated to Texas after October 
1, 1837, or who would immigrate before January 1, 1840, could receive 
640 acres of ·land free. This was a conditional grant, with the land 
becoming his at the end of three years' residence. All single free 
white men could receive 320 acres under the same conditions. The act 
also granted the same amounts of free land to all officers and men en-
19 gaged in the service of the Republic of Texas prior to March 1, 1837. 
17Seymour V. Connor, Adventure .!u. Glory (Austin, 1965), p. 31. 
18Ray Allen Billington, The Far Western Frontier 1830-1860 (New 
York, 1956), p. 134. 
19H. P. N. Gammel, The~!?.£ Texas, 1822-1897 (Austin, 1898) II, 
PP• 35-36° 
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9 
This act was also intended to place some control on land speculation 
and prevent the further buildup of ownership of large blocks of the best 
land by a few individuals, thereby greatly reducing the saleable poten-
tial of government land. 
Despite the fact the Texas Congress was giving land free to 
encourage immigration, land was still the only saleable commodity the 
Republic of Texas had. The speculative possibilities offered by Texas 
land was what decided Lamar, and many others, to settle in Texas. Means 
were found to circumvent the land law requiring an individual to reside 
on his land, and many individuals invested in Texas land. All this was 
good for the future of the Republic, but contributed little money to a 
nearly empty treasury. The Republic of Texas needed large sums of money 
immediately, not later. 
Financial problems were a way of life for the young republic. From 
its beginning, the Republic of Texas was plagued by the shortage of 
funds; what little money there was came mainly from friends in the 
United States. 20 These same friends, and others like them, had helped 
the Republic of Texas through its financial difficulties during the 
Republic's revolutionary period. The merchants of New Orleans, Mobile, 
and other southern cities, had advanced supplies on credit. Individuals 
and groups of individuals in these same cities who were sympathetic to 
the Texas cause either gave or loaned money to help ease the revolu-
tion's financial plight, but the money received never equaled the money 
needed. Little of the,money ever reached'Texas, for most of it was 
spent in New Orleans tind other southern coastal cities to procure badly 
20christian, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, p. 236. 
10 
needed supplies. The treasurer's report of March 1, 1836, showed a 
total of $3,981.85 received and expended, with revenue providing most of 
this amount. When the amounts of money given and loaned to Texas during 
its revolutionary period were totaled, $25,000 came from donations and 
21 $100,000 came from loans. Even in its revolutionary period, loans 
were an important part of the future republic's finances. 
The first time a formal attempt was made to secure funds through a 
loan was on October 27, 1835. The Permanent Council, a group of Texans 
charged with carrying out the functions of government from October 16, 
1835, to November 3, 1835, appointed Thomas F. McKinney, a New Orleans 
merchant, to negotiate a loan of one hundred thousand dollars in New 
Orleans. McKinney excused himself on the grounds the Permanent 
Council's authority was questionable. Furthermore, he felt the firm of 
McKinney and Williams, together with other local merchants in New 
Orleans, were capable of supplying the immediate necessities of the 
22 
revolutionary army. 
With the refusal of McKinney to negotiate a loan, the General Con-
sultation, which had assumed the functions of government from the 
Permanent Council, concluded the best approach for obtaining a loan was 
through commissioners. On November 12, 1835, the Consultation appointed 
B. T. Archer, W. H. Wharton, and Stephen F. Austin as commissioners to 
the United States. They were given such powers and instructions as the 
21Eugene c. Barker, "The Finances of the Texas Revolution," 
Poli ti cal Science Quarterly, XIX, No. 4 ( 1904), p. 634. 
22Ibid. 1 PP• 614-615. 
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"governor and general council may deem expedient" to conclude a loan. 23 
The Consultation then organized a Provisional Government, consisting of 
a governor, lieutenant-governor, and a council, and then adjourned until 
the following March first. 
The Council took a week to decide on its instruction to the commis-
sioners and two weeks more to pass an ordinance authorizing a loan of 
one million dollars. Ten $100,000 bonds, payable in not less than five 
years nor more than ten years, bear.ing ·interest not to exceed ten per 
cent per annum, were prepared. The commissioners were instructed to 
secure the best possible terms, and if the bonds were not considered 
sufficient security "to pledge or hypothecate the public lands of Texas, 
and to pledge the public faith"; in short, everything Texas had, as 
security. 2~ Two weeks later the commissioners sailed for New Orleans 
where they hoped to sell the bonds. 
On January 10, 1836, the commissioners informed Governor Henry 
Smith they had arranged for two loans totaling two hundred and fifty 
thousand dollars. The first loan was for two hundred thousand, and was 
subscribed by four men from Cincinnati, three from Kentucky, two from 
Virginia, and one from New Orleans. The lenders advanced ten per cent 
of the amount, with the balance to be paid upon ratification of their 
contract. The contract gave the lenders the right if they chose--· 
and they did--to;accept land .at·arate:;of fifty .cents an·acre as· a 
suitable method of repayment. The Texas Government was to survey 
23 Ibid., p. 627. 
2
~Ibid., pp. 628-629. 
and plot the land into six hundred and forty acre tracts, with the 
lenders having two months in which to select their tracts of land. 25 
The second loan was for fifty thousand dollars. Seven of the 
twelve subscribers came from New Orleans, three from Virginia, and two 
from Kentucky. This loan was supposed to have been made in cash, but 
only $~5,802 can actually be accounted for. The basic difference be-
tween the two contracts was that the subscribers of the first loan had 
12 
the right of first choice on land location. As in the case of the first 
loan 1 acquisition of land was the sole purpose of the subscribers. 26 
Ratification of these loans became the responsibility of the 
Interim Government of David G. Burnet. When the General Consultation 
reassembled on March 1, 1836, the delegates had plenary powers to form 
a permanent government. By this time, separation from Mexico was the 
desire and main interest of nearly everyone in Texas. On March second, 
the convention made a declaration of independence and sixteen days later 
adopted a constitution. Burnet was appointed president ad interim 
and the convention adjourned, pending ratification of the constitution. 
Burnet questioned the contracts, and believed they might not have 
been in the best interests of Texas. Particularly he questioned two 
articles in which he felt the commissioners had exceeded their author-
ity. Article five provided that "no grant or sale of land shall be 
made by the government of Texas, from and after the date thereof, which 
shall not contain a full reservation of priority for the location to be 
25Ibid., P• 630. 
26Ibid., pp. 630-631. 
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made under this loan. 1127 Article six went even further in assuring the 
lenders access to choice Texas land by declaring that "none of the 
public lands are to be offered at public or private sale until after the 
locations hereinbefore provided for shall have been made. 1128 
President Burnet and his cabinet opposed ratification of the loans, 
seeing them for what they were, land speculation on a large scale. 
Furthermore, these loans committed'the Texas Government to stopping all 
future land sales until the lenders had received satisfaction, at a 
time when the prospects for revenue from the sale of Government lands 
' looked good. The Texas Government proposed to refund the lenders what 
money they had advanced, with twenty per cent interest. Payment would 
be made in two equal payments, one in six months and the other one year 
later. The lenders refused the proposal, they wanted land. A compro-
mise was finally reached that was acceptable to the majority of the 
lenders. They agreed to surrender their right of prior location in re-
turh for thirty-two leagues of land, a league being ~,~28 acres, with 
distribution among the lenders in proportion to the funds they had 
advanced. 29 
While this compromise was being worked out, the Texas Government 
put additional public land on the market. Thomas Toby and his brother 
of New Orleans were authorized to sell five hundred thousand acres at 
fifty cents an acre, the same price the subscribers of the two loans had 
agreed to pay for their land. This action by the Texas Government 
27Ibid., p. 630. 
281bid0 
29 Ibid., p. 632. 
terminated the monopoly created under the loans and the lenders refused 
the compromise, charging the Texas Government with bad faith. Not until 
the Texas Congress, in two acts approved on June J, 1837, and May 24, 
1838, which appropriated land at fifty cents an acre to pay off the two 
loans, was a final settlement achieved.JO 
After completing the two loans in New Orleans, the commissioners 
moved east in search of additional loans. At Mobile they were offered 
a fifty thousand dollar loan, based on the same terms as the New Orleans 
loan, but for reasons unknown, nothing ever came of it. The commission-
ers left Mobile in late February and for a period of time were kept busy 
trying to quiet the rumors that Mexico was reconquering Texas, and that 
a quarrel existed between the governmental authorities in Texas. Not 
until the end of April would the commissioners again find anyone willing 
to invest a large amount of money on the future of the Republic of 
Texas. 
Trying desperately to secure a large loan, Commissioner Austin, on 
April eleventh, made a proposal to Nicholas Biddle, president of the 
United States Bank at Philadelphia. Under the proposal, five hundred 
thousand in Texas bonds would be deposited in the bank in return for a 
five hundred thousand dollar loan. The bonds would run for ten years 
and bring eight per cent interest. But Texas bonds had no bankable 
security, other than land and the public faith, and nothing came of the 
scheme. Four days later, Austin appealed to President Jackson and the 
United States Congress, trying to 'Jbtain a part of the thirty-seven mil-
lion dollar surplus in the United States Treasury. As there was no 
legal basis for the request, this, too, was unsuccessful. Two weeks 
later, a one hundred thousand dollar loan was arranged in New York. 
15 
The contract was similar to the New Orleans contracts, except the lend-
ers had the option of taking land at twenty-five cents an acre. Ten per 
cent of the loan was supposed to have been paid, but only seven thousand 
dollars can be accounted for. As in the case of the other loans, this 
loan provided little immediate relief for the financially bankrupt Texas 
31 government. 
Thus, in spite of the numerous loans attempted or contracted for by 
the commissioners, they were unable to obtain a loan of sufficient size 
to bring a degree of financial stability to the Republic of Texas. How-
ever, they were able to procure many small loans from persons sympa-
thetic to the Texas cause. Most of these loans were in the fifty to a 
few hundred dollars category, with a few exceeding one thousand dollars. 
All told, the commissioners were able to raise one hundred thousand 
dollars for the Republic of Texas. At the end of August, 1836, the 
public debt, including the one hundred thousand dollars in loans, was 
estimated to be $1,250,000. 32 Loans were a big help to the early Texas 
governments, but had not solved their financial problems. 
Still, the possibility of putting the Republic's financial house in 
order through loans continued-to dominate the thinking of most Texans 
and their government. Soon after the Houston administration took office 
in October, 1836, it was evident that loans were the only immediate 
means whereby the Texas Government could balance its budget and reduce 
31Ibid., pp. 633-63~. 
32Ibid. 1 p. 63~. 
16 
the public debt. One of the early laws of the Houston administration, 
approved on November 18, 1836, authorized the President to negotiate a 
five million dollar loan in either the United States or some European 
country. Houston appointed A. J. Yates and M. B. Menard as agents but 
they met with no success, and Yates soon withdrew. Albert B. Burnley 
and Thomas w. Gilmer· then r~placed Yates and Menard, and likewise were 
unsuccessful. Gilmer was replaced by Sam M. Williams, and a short time 
later General James Hamilton, a former governor of South Carolina who 
had been highly successful in obtaining loans from European sources to 
resolve South Carolina's financial crisis, joined Burnley and Williams 
. t t 33 as an assis an. 
On December 10, 1836, the Texas Congress authorized the President 
to negotiate for still another loan, this time to pay for ammunition and 
munitions of war. The twenty thousand dollar loan was to be secured by 
selling land script, which could not be sold for less than fifty cents 
an acre.34 The Republic of Texas was trying to raise money by the only 
means available to it, the selling of public lands, but it was finding 
few purchasers. 
Government expenditures continued to mount and in early May, 1837, 
Houston furloughed the army to reduce expenses.35 In an attempt to 
alleviate the money shortage, 1the Texas Congress, on June 9, 1837, 
authorized the printing of five hundred thous~nd dollars in Promissory 
33Joseph W. Schmidt, T~xas Statecraft, 1836-1845 (San Antonio, 
1941), p. 49. 
34 Gammel, The Laws~ Texas, 1822-1897, I, p. 1136. 
35Joseph M. Nance, Attack and Counter-Attack The Texas-Mexican 
Frontier, 1842 (Austin, 1964), -;:-3. ~ 
17 
Notes. To provide redemption of the notes, Houston was authorized to 
sell five hundred thousand acres of land script at not less than fifty 
cents an acre. The notes were to be used for the civ.il expenses of the 
government. 36 Thus, Texas began the policy of printing money backed by 
an all but empty treasury and the future sale of its public lands. 
While the notes temporarily reduced the money shortage, in the long run 
they led to the depreciation of Texas money, as the notes were issued, 
along with additional issues, again and again. A large loan still con-
tinued to be the only practical solution to the Republic's financial 
crisis. 
Before loan negotiations could begin in any foreign country, the 
Republic of Texas needed recognition as an independent nation so that 
its bonds would be valid securities .in world money markets. On March 3, 
1837, the United States had recognized the Republic of Texas as an 
independent nation. 37 Thus, with this recognition loan negotiations 
could begin. But the United States was presently in a financial crisis, 
diminishing the chances for a loan from that quarter. Onc.\June,20,, 
1837, Houston appointed General J. Pinckney Henderson, his Secretary of 
State, as Agent and Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain and 
38 France. Henderson was first to secure recognition of the Republic 
and then.borrow money. 
To assist its loan commissioners, the Texas Congress, on May 16, 
36 ' Gammel, The laws of Texas, 1822-1897, I, pp. 1309-1310. 
37schmidt, Texas Statecraft, 1836-1845, p. 4,6. 
38George P. Garrison, ed., "Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
Republic of Texas," Annual Report£.!. the Arerican Historical Associ-
ation, III (Washington, 1908-1911), II, p. 808. Hereafter cited as DC. 
18 
1838, passed a loan law similar to the one of November 18, 1836. The 
new law authorized the President"••• to negotiate a loan on the lands 
of the government not to exceed five million dollars. 1139 Bonds were to 
be issued in amounts suitable to the purchasers and two million dollars 
worth would be redeemable at the Texas Government's option, in not less 
than five nor more than thirty years. The public faith was pledged to 
. i ' 4o 
insure payment of interest and redemption of the bonds. 
Despite its financial crisis, the United States was still con-
sidered the primary source for a loan. The commissioners were instruct-
ed to contact first the United States Bank at Philadelphia, then the 
Manhattan Bank of New York, and finally the Union Bank of Louisiana, to 
act as fiscal agents for the Republic of Texas throughout the United 
States and Europe. The commissioners were unable to induce any of the 
banks to act as agent for the Republic's bonds. Neither was Henderson 
able to gain recognition from Great Britain or France. Thus, the 
Republic's financial affairs stood when the Lamar administration took 
office. The badly needed_ loan was still as far away as ever. The 
public debt had climbed to nearly two million dollars, and the 
Republic's treasury was still nearly empty. Government expenditures 
still exceeded revenue and the balance of trade deficit continued to 
increase. Texas money was now worth eighty cents on the dollar, but the 
39tterbert Rook Ed~ards,_ "Diplomatic Relations between France and 
j;llE:l Repllblic, of ~e:x;af:!,~1 Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XX, (Ap:r;i.l, 1917), If:--2~7.·· . - ,, ... c. ••.•.. ,• ~·-,,.,., •• _-.,_;., ,., ,.C- .... ,L .... -.,,,_, -·; - -··_, ,. -· -· "··· > 
... '4o . -
Ibid. 
nearly empty treasury and the printing presses would soon bring down 
~1 its value. 
Notwithstanding the poor state of affairs, Lamar was highly opti-
mistic about his ability to bring financial stability to the Republic 
of Texas. To him, it was a simple matter. The budget could not be 
balanced nor could the public debt be eliminated without additional 
revenue. There was little hope of obtaining this internally, for the 
majority.0£ Texans were living at or near the poverty level. Thus, a 
loan from foreign sources seemed the only logical answer. Even though 
all previous administrations had been unable to secure a loan, Lamar 
was confident his administration could do so. Furthermore, he did not 
believe financial conditions were as bad as they were pictured. Be-
sides, he had great plans and high hopes for the Republic, refusing to 
19 
believe that others could not see, as did he, a Republic"··• stretching 
from the Sabine to the Pacific and as far away to the Southwest as the 
obstinacy of the enemy may render it necessary for the sword to make the 
b d ;.· 11~2 oun ary •. a • a Such a .Republic, Lamar ,believ~d:, should have no 
difficulty obtaining a loan. 
But the Republic Lamar envisioned did not exist. The one he now 
governed was in dire financial straits and had to have immediate finan-
cial assistance if it was to continue. Thus, as the Lamar administra-
tion began its first year in office, the procurement of a loan from 
foreign financial circles became. a must:. 
~~rnest Wallace and David M. Vigness, Documents of Texas History 
(Austin, 1963), P• 127. 
CHAPTER II 
1839: A YEAR OF HIGH HOPES 
Notwithstanding the poor financial condition of the Republic of 
Texas, the Lamar administration began its first year in office with 
great hopes for the Republic's future. The administration's overwhelm-
ing victory in the previous year's election convinced Lamar the Texas 
people were tired of Houston's conservative policies and ready to accept 
the ambitious expansionist program he had in mind. 
Favorable expansion was already occurring in foreign trade. The 
effect of the Commercial Agreement that Henderson was able to work out 
with Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Minister, the previous April, 
was just now beginning to be felt in the Republic of Texas. Under the 
arrangement, Texas ships .would continue to enter British ports under the 
provisions of the existing treaty between Great Britain and Mexico, and 
would continue to do so until such time as Great Britain acknowledged 
the Republic of Texas as a separate and independent nation. 1 Further-
more, Texas ships could import Texas goods into Great Britain as in the 
past, and could continue to do,so.on "the same footing as British ships, 
so long as British ships shall practically enjoy .. the same privileges in 
2 in Texas", or until such 'time as some definitive arrangement is made 
1 Henderson to Irion, April 12, 1838, DC~ I, pp. 856-859. 
2Ibid., p. 857. 
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between Great Britain and the Republic of Texas. This meant that the 
British Government would in effect fail to notice Texas ships no longer 
had Mexican registry. Now, Texans would not have to pay the double im-
port duties and high transportation costs on British goods, which pre-
viously entered Texas through the United States. Also, Texas cotton 
could now be shipped direct to the mills in England which, in time, 
would have a great impact on the balance of trade deficit, as more and 
more cotton was grown in Texas. This arrangement would greatly increase 
direct trade between the two countries, but the Republic of Texas still 
lacked recognition. Loan negotiations still could not begin in Great 
Britain. 
Lamar had loan negotiations continued in the United States. But as 
bad as the Republic needed a loan, domestic programs claimed his immed-
iate attention. In his first message to both Houses of Congress on 
December 21, 1838, Lamar outlined a highly ambitious program of expan-
sion for the Republic. His major domestic programs called for: (1) a 
National Bank, (2) an enlarged Civil Service, (3) a greatly expanded 
Army and Navy, (4) the removal of the Republic's capital to Austin, 
(5) a system of frontier defenses, and (6) the removal of native Indians 
farther west. 3 
The National Bank was to provide all banking services for the 
Republic, no private banks were to be chartered. The bank was to be 
secured by three guarantees; land, specie, and the public faith. Also, 
banking operations were not ~o begin until adequate specie was on 
3Charles Adam Gulick, Jr., and Winnie Allen, eds., The Papers of 
Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, VI (Austin, 1924), II? pp. 349m369. Here-
after cited as Lamar Papers. 
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deposit. But the financial panic of 1837 in the United States had 
destroyed faith in banks and there was never enough specie deposited 
. b t b · t" 4 for the ank o egin opera ions. 
Under Lamar's program, the Civil Service was to be enlarged suf-
ficiently to meet the administrative demands of the Republic. Custom 
houses had to be built and operated, land offices must be opened so land 
could be sold, titles recorded, and fees collected. Also, laws and 
judicial proceedings had to be translated from Spanish into English, 
and a system of courts set up throughout the Republic. These require-
ments resulted in expenditures for the Civil Service the first year of 
I 
Lamar's administration of $550,000, as compared to $192,000, for the 
1 t f H t I d • • t t" 5 as year o ous on s a minis ra ion. 
The Republic's Army called for the heaviest outlay of funds. Army 
appropriations would amount to $1,140,000 the first year; decline 
slightly to $1,056,369, the second year; and drop to only $111,050 the 
last year of Lamar's administration. The majority of these funds were 
used in connection with Lamar 1 s Indian Policy. The Indians had land 
the settlers wanted and had to be moved further west, or the flow of 
immigrants would cease. Altogether, Lamar's Indian Policy cost the 
Republic $2,552~319 and produced little financial gain. By contrast, 
Houston expended only $190,000 on the Indians in his first term as 
president.6 
Lamar's Naval Program called for a Navy that would be an effective 
4 Lamar Papers, II, pp. 362-363. 
5christian, "Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar," p. 245. 
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force in the Gulf of Mexico. He planned to use the Navy to force 
recognition from Mexico, which he saw as a major stumbling block to 
recognition from European countries. The first Texas Navy ceased to 
exist after the Battle of Galveston Coast in June, 1837. Appropriations 
for a second Navy were made in 1837-1838, and the Naval Commissioner was 
authorized to expend $280,000 for six new ships. 7 The ships were deliv-
ered in the fall of 1839, and responsibility for payment fell on the 
Lamar administration. Naval appropriations were $380,455 in 1839, 
$525 ,ooo in 18~, and $100 ,OOO in 1841. 8 
The frontier defense also called for large appropriations. The 
defense plan designed by Lamar's administration was based on a string 
of eight forts to be built from the Nueces River to the Red River west 
of Austin. The forts were to give security to the frontier and also 
provide protection for the settlers from Mexican and Indian raiding 
parties. The Texas Congress passed three acts in January, 1839, appro-
priating $1,080,000 for construction costs and for troops to man the 
fortifications.9 
Removing the Republic's capital from Houston to Austin called for 
building a city on the then unprotected plains along the Colorado River. 
According to stories told, Lamar is supposed to have selected the site 
for the capital on a hunting trip. Land speculation developed and the 
Government realized considerable revenue from the sale of land and city 
lots, but the revenue did not equal the expense of moving the capital. 
7connor, Adventure In Glory, pp. 134-135. 
8christian, 11Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, 11 p. 246. 
9siegel, A Political History 2.£ the Texas Republic 1836m1845, 
p. 106. 
All these programs called for large amounts of money. Appropria-
tions were made but the treasury was nearly empty and could only meet 
this demand by printing more money, and in doing so, it rapidly de-
creased the value of Texas money. In the first six months of the Lamar 
administration, the value of Texas money depreciated by thirty-seven 
and one-half per cent and was now worth no more than fifty cents on the 
10 dollar. 
After initiating his domestic program, Lamar then turned his atten-
tion to foreign affairs and the badly needed loan. As Lamar saw mat-
ters, there were two issues standing in the way of a loan, annexation 
to the United States and recognition as an independent nation by Mexico. 
The annexation issue, he concluded, was p-esently holding up a loan from 
the United States and possibly had a bearing on Great Britain's reluc-
tance to recognize the Republic of Texas. The lack of recognition from 
Mexico Lamar saw as the primary reason Texas did not get recognition by 
European countries. The annexation issue was relatively easy for Lamar 
to understand, but he was unable to solve the issue of recognition by 
Mexico. 
Annexation to the United States had been an issue from the early 
days of the Republic. In fact, many citizens in Texas and the United 
States believed that Texas was once a part o~ the United States under 
the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and had been wrongly returned to Spain 
in the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819. In the early days of exploration in 
the Southwest, both Spain and France claimed the region that is now 
Texas. France based her claim on the explorations of La Salle and the 
10Gouge, The Fiscal History 2f Texas, p. 268. 
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colony he established at Matagorda Bay in 1685 1 while the Spanish 
claimed the area by right of settlement and French abandonment of its 
colony. 
By the Treaty of Fontainebleau, in 1762, France had ceded Louisiana 
to Spain. In the secret Treaty of San Idlefonso, Spain had retroceded 
Louisiana to France in October, 1800. Once the terms of this treaty 
became known, the United States Government became concerned over its 
right of free navigation of the Mississippi River, and the right of 
deposit at New Orleans, which Spain had guaranteed under the Treaty of 
San Lorenzo, in 1795. It was this concern that ultimately led to the 
purchase of Louisiana by the United States in 1803. 
The treaty under which the United States purchased Louisiana in-
eluded language of the French-Spanish Treaty of San Idlefonso, wordage 
that would lead to disputes over the location of the boundary between 
the United States and Spanish North America; and would not be resolved 
until the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819. The Adams-Onis Treaty described 
Louisiana as 
'the.colony or province of Louisiana, w;th the·same 
extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it 
had when France possessed it; and such as it should be after 
the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and 
other States.•11 
Thus, the question arose as to the boundaries of Louisiana when 
France first claimed it. Did its western boundary lie along the Neches 
River, which Spain considered as the boundary between Louisiana and 
Texas, or did it begin at Matagorda Bay, where La Salle established the 
French colony in 1685? The dispute was settled for the most in 1819, 
11Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy 
(2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1965), p. 52. 
when the Adams-Onis Treaty set the Sabine River as the western border of 
Louisiana. But many still refused to accept the Sabine as the boundary. 
Therefore, when the Republic of Texas presented its petition of annexa-
tion to the United States Congress in 1837, many in the United States 
considered Texas as being returned to its rightful place. 
But there were also many others that did not welcome the Republic's 
request for annexation, namely the anti-slavery people and the aboli-
tionists. They saw in the annexation of Texas a threat to the delicate 
balance of power established in the Missouri Compromise of 1820 regard-
ing slavery. With Texas in the union, the balance of power would be 
upset and the exponents of slavery ~ould have a majority in the United 
States Congress. Many violent debates followed. The issue was tern-
porarily sidetracked when the United States recognized the Republic of 
Texas on March 3, 1837, but the debates continued. By the summer of 
1838, annexation had become such a hot political issue that President 
Van Buren used his influence and induced John Q. Adams to make a speech 
that for the time ended the Republic's chances for annexation. 12 
Houston, seeing there was no chance for annexation at this time, 
decided to withdraw the Republic's petition. Furthermore, the mood of 
the Texas people had changed, and they no longer favored annexation. On 
the twelfth of October, Anson Jones, the Republic of Texas Minister to 
the United States, withdrew the petition. 13 This was less than two 
months before Houston's term as president expired, and left to the 
12samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxtord History .2f the American People 
(New York, 1965), P• 553 • 
13schmidt, Texas Statecraft 1836m1845, p. 62. 
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incoming administration the decision of raising the issue of annexation 
again at a more favorable time. 
There was no place for annexation in the plans Lamar had for the 
Republic of Texas. Had there been any doubt in his mind as to his 
course of action, it was dispelled in a letter he received from James 
Hamilton, who had just returned from England in October. Hamilton told 
of his conversations prior to departing from England with Lord 
Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary. According to Hamilton, 
Palmerston had expressed a great deal of interest in the Republic's 
ability to maintain itself against Mexico. From this Hamilton concluded 
that if the Republic would withdraw its petition of annexation, England 
would soon recognize the Republic of Texas, and with recognition accom-
1/,i, plished, the loan Texas needed would soon follow. 
Once in office, Lamar was not long in ~elling out his administra-
tion's stand on annexation. In his inaugural address to both Houses of 
Congress in December, 1838, Lamar recalled that at one time nearly-
everyone in Texas favored annexation, but now the majority of Texans 
favored an independent Texas. He then summarized the rights Texas would 
lose under annexation and contrasted them.with the Texas he envisioned, 
concluded that: 
I cannot regard the annexation of Texas to the Amer'ican 
Union in any other light than as the grave of all her hopes 
of happiness and g·reatness; and if, contrary to the present 
state of affairs, the amalgamation shall ever hereafter take 
place, I shall feel that the· blood of our martyred heroes had 
been shed' in vain--t:hat we had riv.en the chains of Mexican 
despotism only to fetter our country with more indissoluble 
bonds, and that a young republic just rising into high 
11,i,Hamilton to Lamar, October 11, 1838, Lamar Papers, II, pp. 2/,i,3-
distinction among the nations of the earth, had been 
swallowed up and lost like a proud bark in a devouring 
vortex. 15 
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A few days after Lamar's inaugural address, the Texas Congress formally 
withdrew its resolutions endorsing annexation, an action the previous 
16 
congress under Houston had refused to do. Annexation was a dead issue 
as far as the Lamar administration was. concerned. 
Lamar next turned his attention to the task of gaining recognition 
from Mexico, which he believed to be the one remaining obstacle to 
recognition by the European countries. Once Mexico granted recognition, 
there was good reason to believe the loan would soon follow. He did not 
mention Mexico in his inaugural address. However, in his first message 
to both Houses of Congress on December 21, 1838, Lamar left no doubt as 
to the Republic's stand in independence. As far as Texas was concerned, 
he noted there was no change in its desire for full independence and any 
hope Mexico had of recovering Texas was a futile one, moreso since it 
had no means whereby this hope could be realized. Furthermore, Lamar 
continued, 
.... it may become the dµtyand.interest of Texas~ to reduce 
the question of her right of Independence, to a more summary 
adjustment than our adversary seems inclined to give it. 
While we would meet with alacrity the first indication of a 
desire, for a just and honorable peace,- we should compel a 
more active prosecution of the war. If peace can be obtained 
only by the sword, let the sword do its work.17 
In short, Lamar felt the time'had come for Mexico to recognize the inde-
pendence of the Republic of Texas, whether peacefully or through force. 
15 . . 
Lamar Papers, II, p. 321. 
16ch · t. M" b B t Lam 131 ris ian, ira eau uonapar e ar, p. • 
17 Lamar Papers, II, p. 3~8. 
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Seeking to obtain recognition from Mexico peacefully through nego-
tiation 1 Lamar, on February 20, 1839, appointed his Secretary of State, 
Barnard E. Bee, as Agent and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Government 
of Mexico. 18 According to instructions received from James Webb, 
Lamar's new Secretary of State, Bee was to proceed to Vera Cruz, or some 
similar location on the Mexican coast, and attempt to hand his creden-
tials to a representative of the Mexican Government, which, if received, 
would constitute recognition of the Republic of Texas. Once Bee had 
been received, he was to try to negotiate a treaty of peace, which must 
include the unconditional recognition of the independence of the 
Republic of Texas; a Texas with boundaries as defined by an Act of the 
Texas Congress on December 19, 1836. 19 Under this act, the Republic of 
Texas.established the Rio Grande as its boundary with Mexico, instead of 
the Nueces River, which Mexico had always considered as the southern 
boundary of the Department of Texas. 
Webb, aware that the Mexican Government would have little inclina-
tion to recognize Texas as an independent nation, suggested it would be 
better for Bee to attempt to .enter Mexico as an Agent of the Texas 
Government. Furthermore, as Webb pointed out, Bee had authority to 
treat for peace as an agent or minister. Thus, should the Mexican 
Government receive Bee as an Agent of the Texas Government, the instruc-
tions continued, and Bee found the Mexican Government willing to treat 
18Bee had been Secretary of 'W~r in Houston's administration but 
fell out with him over the appointment of James Hamilton to negotiate 
the loan, resigned from Houston's cabinet, and joined those supporting 
Lamar in his bid for president. Bee became Lamar's Secretary of State 
but resigned to accept the appointment to Mexico. 
19 Webb to Bee, February 20, 1839, DC, '.II, pp. 1±32-4:37. 
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for the restoration of peace and then recognition of the Republic of 
Texas but not a Texas as defined by the Texas Congress, Bee was autho-
rized to offer the Mexican Government up to five million dollars for 
the land between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande. Texas would pay 
for this land in five equal payments, with the first payment to be made 
20 
one year after the exchange of ratifications of the treaty. Knowing 
the chaotic financial situation in Mexico, the Lamar administration 
believed that the Mexican Government would be unable to turn down this 
offer. Also, the offer provided the Mexican Government with a means 
whereby it could justify the loss of land to the highly emotional 
Mexican population, by pointing out that Texas was willing to buy 
worthless land. 
There were, however, others besides the Republic of Texas who were 
interested in this land between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. English 
holders of Mexican bonds were also interested in this land. When Mexico 
declared its independence from Spain in 1821, financial stability soon 
became a major issue for the Government. Loans were sought abroad, with 
several being obtained in England. But the Mexican Government never 
seemed able to repay the loans. Thus, a $J,200,000 loan received in 
1825, together with accumulated interest, amounted to slightly over five 
million dollars in 1839. 21 
In April 1837, the Mexican Government offered the English bond-
holders land in its northern departments, which included land between 
the Nueces River and the Rio Grande, in payment of their claims. This 
20Ibid., p. ~JJ. 
21Ae Andreades, History .2£ the Bank of England (New York, 1966), 
p. 250. 
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move by the Mexican Government would accomplish two things. First, it 
was a means of settling the claims of the English bondholders and re= 
ducing the national debt; and second, English landowners would soon 
call for English colonists and with them would come involvement with the 
British Government. This would further strengthen relations between the 
British and Mexican governments and also bring England into Mexico 1 s 
dispute with Texas. 
The English bondholders accepted the offer in September of that 
year. On October thirteenth, Henderson brought this offer up in his 
first meeting with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston. 
Henderson asked Palmerston if the British Government had any direct 
interest in the claims or if it sanctioned these proceeding, to which 
Palmerston replied that the British Government had neither. 22 On 
October sixteenth, Henderson advised F. De Lizardi and Company, the 
London agents of the Mexican Government, the land offered by the Mexican 
Government between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande was located in 
what is now the Republic of Texas, and Mexico no longer has sovereignty 
over Texas. Also, 
That the people of Texas having on the 7th day of November 
1835 assumed the reins of Government in that country and 
subsequently declared their independence and entire separa-
tion from Mexico, and established the present .constitutional 
government, no grant or sale of Land in Texas made by the 
Government of Mexico, since the said 7th November 1835, will 
be regarded as valid by the present government of Texas. 23 
Thus, nearly two years before Bee began his mission to Mexico, the 
22 Henderson to Irion, October 14, 1837, DC, I, pp. 818-819. 
23Henderson to Irion, October 14, 1837, DC, I, P• 830. 
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Republic of Texas let the world know that it considered the land between 
the Nueces and Rio Grande as being a part of Texas. 
For reasons unknown, Bee did not set out for Mexico until the first 
of April, 1839. He went first to Pensacola, then Mobile, and finally to 
New Orleans, looking for transportation to Mexico. In the meantime, 
instructions similar to Bee's were sent to Richard G. Dunlap, the 
Republic's minister in Washington. Dunlap was given plenary powers to 
treat for peace and independence with the Mexican minister at Washing-
ton. Also, in event the United States could be induced to act as 
mediator for the dispute, Dunlap was authorized to negotiate with who-
ever was designated to negotiate. Washington would provide a neutral 
ground for negotiations and at the same time prevent the Mexican Govern-
ment the embarrassment of having the negotiations held in Mexico. 
Dunlap presented the idea of mediation to the United States State 
Department. In reply, Forsyth, the Secretary of State, advised Dunlap 
the United States was willing to act as mediator, provided that the 
Mexican Government also asked the United States to interpose. But no 
request was received from the Mexican Government and the matter was 
2~ dropped. 
While waiting in New Orleans for passage to Vera Cruz, Bee became 
acquainted with a Mr. Gordon of the House of Lizardi, an English trading 
company. In addition to representing the Mexican Government in its 
attempt to settle the long standing claims related to loans Mexico had 
obtained in England, the company also had extensive trade interests in 
Mexico and was on good terms with the majority of the Mexican Government 
24webb to Bee, February 20, 1839, DC, II, p. ~36; Webb to Dunlap, 
March 13, 1839, DC, II, pp. 368-372. 
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officials. In the conversations that followed, Bee let it be known the 
Republic of Texas was willing to pay up to five million dollars for the 
disputed land between the Nueces and Rio Grande. Gordon, seeing a 
chance for the English bondholders to be paid for their long standing 
investment in Mexican bonds, offered to write the Mexican Government 
urging consideration of Texas's overtures for peace, and also to 
Pakenham, Great Britain's'Minister to Mexico, suggesting the use of his 
office to further the cause for peace. In his letter to Pakenham, 
Gordon also pointed out that once peace and recognition of the indepen-
dence of Texas were arranged, there was J good possibility the English 
bondholders could end up with the five million dollars Texas was willing 
to pay for the disputed land. 25 
Bee sailed for Mexico on May second, arriving at Vera Cruz six days 
later. He contacted General Victoria, the Commandant at Vera Cruz, who 
informed the Mexican Government of Bee's arrival and the purpose of his 
visit. While Bee waited at Vera Cruz to hear from the Mexican Govern-
ment, Pakenham, who by now had received Gordon's communication, attempt-
ed to intercede for Bee. He made several attempts to get the Mexican 
Government to listen to Bee's proposal for peace but was unsuccessful. 
The Mexican Government would listen to no proposal whereby the country 
would be dismembered, still considering Texas a rebellious department 
that must be brought to terms. Finally, Pakenham advised Bee there was 
no chance the Mexican Government would receive him at this time, neither 
would it consent to considering his proposals for peace and recognition. 
On May twenty-ninth, Bee returned to New Orleans, more convinced than 
25Hamilton to Fox, May 20, 1839, DC, I, pp. 867-870 1 Christian, 
Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, pp. 136-138. 
ever negotiation should have been initiated in Washington. Thus, 
Lamar's first attempt to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Mexico 
ended in failure. 26 
31,i,. 
Lamar had not let his concern for peace and recognition from Mexico 
allow him to forget the necessity of procuring a loan. Soon after 
becoming president, he reviewed the previous administration's loan 
attempts, much of which was well-known to him as vice president of that 
administration. Burnley and Williams, Houston's last loan commission-
ers, had spent the past summer and fall attempting to obtain a loan from 
Nicholas Biddle and the United States Bank at Philadelphia. For quite 
some time, Biddle has shown a great deal of interest in Texas and its 
financial dilemma, and both commissioners felt he was just on the verge 
of offering a loan to the Republic of Texas. 
In late September, Hamilton, who had been to Europe assessing the 
prospects for a loan in France and England, joined Burnley and Williams. 
Hamilton was a close friend of Biddle and had worked with him when 
securing the loans for South ,Carolina. It was hoped that Hamilton's 
close friendship with Biddle would enable him to convince Bid'dle to 
offer the loan. 
But the political atmosphere and economic conditions in the United 
States were not favorable for Biddle to offer a loan to Texas. The 
nation was now beginning to feel the full effect of the financial panic 
of 1837, and the abolitionist forces and sentiment against slavery were 
gaining strength in the northern states; states which included many 
directors of Biddle's bank. ·on October 6, 1838, Biddle wrote Burnley 
26christian, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, P• 137· 
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and Williams that despite the fact he was strongly in favor of extending 
a loan to the Republic of Texas, the present political situation pre-
t d h . d · at th" t" 27 ven e is 01ng so is 1me. Burnley and Williams remained in 
Philadelphia hoping that Biddle would change his mind, while Hamilton 
went to Texas to report on loan prospects in Europe. Thus, the loan 
attempts up to the beginning of the Lamar administration had not pro-
duced the much needed loan. 
As soon as Lamar had his domestic program under way, he turned his 
attentions to the loan negotiations. On December 24, 1838, Lamar nomi-
nated Hamilton for the post of Commissioner of Loans. Two days later~ 
the Texas Senate confirmed the nomination. Hamilton was to replace 
Williams, who had been rejected by the new Congress. According to 
Hamilton's instructions, he was to join Burnley, who was still in the 
United States, and try to secure a loan; and if unsuccessful, they then 
were to proceed to Europe and try to obtain one from either France or 
England, provided Henderson had received recognition for the Republic 
28 
of Texas. 
Hamilton had been in communication with Lamar for some time prior 
to being nominated for Commissioner of Loans. He had written Lamar long 
and detailed letters in which the prospects for a loan in Europe were 
assessed and had outlined how he thought the terms of the loan contract 
should read. In a letter written in November 1838, Hamilton suggested 
the advisability of establishing a three hundred thousand dollar sinking 
27 Seymour V. Connor, The Texas Treasury Papers, III (Austin, 1955), 
I, pp. 133-138, Hereafter cited as TTP. 
28Edwards, "Diplomatic Relations Between France and the Republic 
of +'exas, 11 p. 229. 
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fund to insure that interest on the loan would be met. Also, the money 
for the sinking fund should be an annual appropriation and invested in 
securities and corporate stocks in the United States. At the same time, 
Hamilton had encouraging news regarding the prospects of a loan from 
Biddle's bank. He told of interviews with Biddle after the October 
sixth refusal, which led him to believe that Biddle intended to take up 
th 1 . th . 29 e oan in e spring. 
The Texas Congress, however, was in no mood to wait for spring and 
the possibility of a loan. On January 22, 1839, an Act was passed 
authorizing the President to negotiate a loan of one million dollars. 
The loan was to bear eight per cent interest and was ·to be redeemable in 
ten years. The bondholders had the option of taking public land in lieu 
of principal and interest. 30 The five million dollar loan, it should be 
recalled, offered ten per cent interest and was redeemable at the dis-
cretion of the Texas Government in not less than five nor more than 
thirty years. Major James Reily of the Treasury Department was sent to 
New Orleans to sell the bonds. He received several offers, but none 
that would accept the Republic's bonds at par. 
On February twenty-first, Lamar wrote Reily that the frontier was 
suffering from a lack of protection due to the government being out of 
funds, therefore, he was to take the offer of three hundred thousand 
for five hundred thousand dollars in Texas bonds, providing the payment 
was made in specie. After purchasing supplies for the army, Reily was 
to send the remainder of the money to Texas and stay in New Orleans to 
29Hamilton to Lamar, October 11 and November J, 1838, Lamar Papers, 
II, pp. 24J-245; 274-279. 
JO Gammel, The Laws£.!. Texas, 1822-1897, II, pp. 64-65. 
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sell the remaining bonds at the best possible price, but in no case less 
than eighty cents on the dollar. 31 On March nineteenth, Reily wrote the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Richard Dunlap, that he was unable to com-
plete the sale of five hundred thousand dollars in government bonds 
due to the precarious situation of the bank extending the offer. There 
had been a run on the bank, and it was no longer paying specie. Also, 
he had received no other offers nor were there any negotiations present-
1 . 32 yin progress. 
Shortly afterward, Hamilton arrived in New Orleans. He confirmed 
the New Orleans money situation to Lamar and stated his intention to 
remain there to help Reily dispose of the bonds, although it would be 
very difficult in view of the fact money in the hands of brokers was 
worth four per cent per month. The first of April, Hamilton again wrote 
Lamar, but this time recommended the removal of the bonds from the mar-
ket as they would bring at the best, fifty cents on the dollar. 
Furthermore, their remaining on the market could jeopardize the chance 
of selling the five mil+ion in bonds on the east coast. Dunlap further 
confirmed the poor money situation three days later. At the time, 
Dunlap was in New Orleans on his way to Washington to take up his post 
as Minister to the United States. On April thirteenth, James Webb, 
Acting Secretary of the Treasury, wrote Reily directing him to remove 
the bonds from the market and return them to the treasury department. 33 
3 1Lamar to Reily, Febru~ry 21, 1839, Lamar Papers, II, pp. 458-459. 
32Reily to Dunlap, March 19, , 1839, TTP, I, p. 202. 
33Hamilton to Lamar, March 31 and April 4, 1839; Dunlap to Lamar, 
April 4, 1839 1 Webb to Reily, April 13, 1839, Lamar Papers, II, pp. 
509-515; 526. 
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As was the case with the attempt to sell the five million in bonds to 
Biddle and the United States Bank at Philadelphia, the time was not 
right, and the first major attempt of the Lamar administration to obtain 
a loan ended in failure. The money markets of Europe seemed to be the 
only hope left. 
In the middle of April, Hamilton wrote Lamar that he intended to 
make one more attempt at procuring a loan in the United States before he 
left for Europe around the middle of June. Hamilton expressed no con~ 
cern that Biddle was no longer president of the United States Bank at 
Philadelphia, and still believed a loan could be completed with that 
institution. However, he concluded, due to the pressing need of the 
Republic of Texas for funds, a loan of only five hundred thousand dol-
lars should be sought, and then concentrate all efforts for the five 
million dollar loan in Europe.34 
En route from his home in South Carolina to Philadt?lphia, Hamilton 
stopped off in Washington to contact H. S. Fox, the British Minister in 
Washington. Bee had written Hamilton of the attempt of Pakenham, the 
British Minister to Mexico 1 to act as mediator and had also included the 
proposal of Gordon, the agent of Lizardi and Company, whereby the money 
Texas paid for the land between the Nueces and Rio Grande, would end up 
in the hands of British holders of Mexican bonds. Hamilton discussed 
both the possibility of mediation by Pakenham and the plan of Gordon. 
He saw in Gordon's plan a way for Mexico to save its honor and at the 
same time treat with the Republic of Texas for peace and recognition. 
Hamilton also advised Fox of his appointment as commissioner to 
34Hamilton to Lamar, April 14, 1839, Lamar Papers, II, pp. 526~528. 
negotiate a loan of about one million sterling in England and that he 
planned to leave for England in early June. 35 
To reinforce the arguments for the recognition needed by the 
Republic of Texas before loan negotiations could begin in England, 
Hamilton pointed out to Fox four reasons why it was in the best inter-
39 
ests of England for her to help bring about peace between Mexico and tbe 
Republic of Texas, and the recognition of Texas independence by Mexico. 
First, that by the fall of 1839, Texas would again have a navy and would 
be able to blockade the ports of Mexico. Since England had not recog~ 
nized the Republic of Texas, and should she decide not to recognize such 
a blockade, such an action could lead to bloodshed and a possible alli-
ance of Texas with the Canadian people, who were presently at odds with 
Great Britain. Second, Hamilton pointed out the many trade advantages 
to Great Britain, the vast acreages in Texas that could produce cotton 
for the English mills, plus its wealth in minerals and other natural 
resources. Next, Hamilton noted that if Mexico did not recognize the 
independence of Texas first, this would put Great Britain in a difficult 
position because of its dispute with the Canadian Provinces and also 
easily drive the Texas commerce into the hands of other European coun-
tries, namely France. Last to be discussed was the slave trade. Texas 
had prohibited slavery in its constitution, Hamilton declared; there-
fore, there was no issue between Great Britain and Texas. In replying 
to Hamilton, Fox remained non-committal beyond the fact he intended to 
advise Pakenham and Pal.merston of Hamil ton I s correspondence. 36 
35 Hamilton to Fox, May 20, 1839, Fox to Hamilton, May 22, 1839, 
DC, I, pp. 867=871· 
36Ibid. 
Hamilton then continued on to Philadelphia, where Burnley was 
waiting for him. On May twenty-ninth, Hamilton wrote Lamar that he and 
Burnley had that day concluded an arrangement for a loan with Biddle and 
the United States Bank at Philadelphia. The loan was to be an advance 
on the five million dollar loan they expected to obtain in England, and 
carried the provision that word of this advance was not to be announced 
until after the loan in England had been negotiated. This loan of four 
hundred thousand dollars was in United States Post Notes and would be 
available at the Merchants Bank in New Orleans, just as soon as the 
notes could be transferred. For handling the funds, the Merchants Bank 
would discount them seven and one-half per cent. 37 
Within a week Hamilton forwarded two hundred thousand of the post 
notes by his son, Thomas, but did not send the remaining two hundred 
thousand until three weeks later with James A. Treat, a New York busi-
nessman, who had agreed to help in the recognition issue with Mexico. 
Treat had lived in Mexico for many years and was personally acquainted 
with Santa Anna and many high Mexican officials. Hamilton had written 
Lamar previously conceiming Treat, suggesting him as an aide to Bee in 
his negotiations, unaware that Bee had already returned from his mission 
unsuccessfu1. 38 
Treat traveled to New Orleans, left the post notes, and then on to 
Texas. On August 9, 1839, he was appointed a Private and Confidential 
Agent of the Republic of Texas for the purpose of negotiating peace and 
independence with Mexico. He was given the same instructions as Bee had 
37Hamilton to Lamar, May 29 and 31, 1839, Lamar Papers, III, pp. 
1-7. 
38Hamilton to Lamar, June 22 and 28, 1839, DC, II, pp. 450-455. 
received; peace, recognition of the independence of Texas, with bound-
aries as defined by the Republic's Congress, and the purchase of the 
disputed land between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande for not more 
than five million dollars. Before Treat was to submit the Rio Grande, 
from its mouth to the source, as sine qua !12.!!. in boundary negotiations, 
he was to suggest another boundary as a bargaining point. This boundary 
was to run from: 
a line. commencing at the mouth of the ·Rio Grande ·mid 
way of its channel, up that stream to the Paso del Norte 
and from thence due west on a line to the Gulf of 
California and alon9 the Southern shore of that Gulf to 
the Pacific Ocean.3 
Treat'was not to insist strenuously on this boundary, rather it was 
intended to give Mexico an indication of what Texas felt was in store 
for Mexican lands in the far west. 40 
Upon receiving these instructions, Treat immediately left Austin 
and returned to New York, where he remained for nearly two months before 
departing for Mexico the latter part of October. He arrived at Vera 
Cruz on the twenty-eighth of November; and gaining entrance to Mexico. 
went on to Mexico City, arriving there on December eleventh. Treat 
immediately contacted Pakenham, and together they attempted to bring 
about an agreement between Mexico and the Republic of Texas, but no 
41 
success was made during the remainder of the year. 
Meanwhile, Hamilton was still in New York. Instead of proceeding 
to England as previously planned, he sailed for France the first of 
39Burnet to Treat, August 9~ 1839, DC, II, pp. 470-472. 
40lbid. 
41ch. t" ris ian, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar 1 pp. 139-140. 
August. There were two major reasons for this change in plans. First, 
the London stock market was greatly depressed at the moment, due pri-
marily to the uncertain crop conditions in England. Hamilton saw little 
chance for a loan under these conditions. It was the second reason, 
however, that was really his reason for changing his plans. Count 
Alphonso de Saligny, the French agent who had been sent to Texas to 
ascertain political and economic conditions in the Republic to be used 
by the French Government in making its decision regarding recognizing 
the Republic of Texas, was on his way back to France to make his report. 
Hamilton felt the report would be favorable and was determined to stay 
close to Saligny until the report was given. Should the report be 
favorable and the French Government decide to recognize Texas, this 
would immediately open up the French money markets for a possible 
1±2 loan. 
Arriving in Paris, Hamilton conferred with Henderson, who was 
attempth'llg to arrange a treaty with the French Government. Henderson 
had left England soon after completing the Commercial Arrangement in 
1838, and was still trying to obtain recognition for Texas from a major 
European country. While in Paris, Hamilton wrote Lamar that the time 
was not right for attempting a loan in England. England, at that. time, 
was trying to recover from the very unfavorable harvest the previous 
year, which had caused the export.of about seven million sterling. This 
action resulted in an unfavorable balance of trade, leading to the 
scarcity of money and'the Bank of England having to borrow two million 
sterling from the Barn.k of France. This had also increased the interest 
li:2Hamilton to Lainar 1 July 8 and August 1, 18.39, DC, IIi pp. L,i,59; 
/,i,68=!,i,69. 
rates to as much as ten per cent on the best English securities, and 
driving foreign securities off the market. However, he was told there 
was the possibility of a good harvest this year. If this occurred, 
then English money markets would be restored to a more normal condition 
in a short time, and that sometime between October and January would be 
the earliest the Texas loan should be brought onto the market. 43 
Hamilton sailed for England the middle of September and joined 
Burnley, who had been in London since late June trying to generate 
interest in the loan. Henderson, meanwhile, continued negotiations in 
Paris and on September 25, 1839, successfully completed a Treaty of 
Amity, Navigation, and Commerce with France, making France the first 
European country to recognize the Republic of Texas. 44 
While in London, Hamilton asked for and was granted an interview 
with Palmerston, the substance of which he reported to Lamar immediately 
upon his return to New York in early October •. In the interview, 
Palmerston advised Hamilton the British Government had for some time 
been satisfied that the Republic of Texas had achieved her independence 
from Mexico, and that any hope Mexico had of reconquest was illusionary. 
Also, that Great Britain was ready to recognize and conclude a treaty 
with the Republic of Texas, but if recognition was given at this time, 
it would impair any influence she would have as a mediator between 
Mexico and Texas. Palmerston also informed Hamilton that Pakenham had 
been instructed to offer mediation, and until such time as a reply was 
received from Pakenham, the state of affairs between Great Britain and 
43Hamilton to Lamar 1 August 29, 1839, Lamar Papers, III, pp. 82-84. 
44 Henderson to Lamar, October 11, 1839, Lamar Papers, III, pp. 
118-119. 
4:5 the Republic of Texas should remain as they now are. 
This was a change in thinking on Palmerston's part and also a 
change in British foreign policy. When Pakenham first offered to act 
as mediator between Mexico and Texas, Palmerston had withheld permis-
sion. At the time, he h~d good reason for doing so. In the first 
place, it waslighly important to Great Britain, both politically and 
economically, that the status quo be maintained in the Caribbean. 
British influence was very high throughout the entire Caribbean region, 
but there was the possibility that the United States would attempt to 
increase its influence in the Caribbean, something that bothered 
Palmerston greatly. When the United States recognized the Republic of 
Texas in 1837, this action moved the United States into greater involve-
ment in the region. The Monroe Doctrine, while helping to protect 
British trade interests and investments in Central and South America, 
had awakened in the United States a spirit of paternalism that would 
later be called Manifest Destiny. Also, commercial interests in the 
United States were looking for new areas of investment. The Caribbean 
presented such an opportunity, but this would bring them into competi-
tion with British commercial interests, something else that Palmerston 
did not want. By 1825, Great Britain had over $125,000,000 invested in 
Mexico, Central and South America, and British trade to this region was 
' . 11 4:6 increasing annua y. The best estimates in 1838, placed British 
investments at nearly twice that figure. 
In 1838, the Republic o! Texas and Mexico both provided a barrier 
4:5Hamilton to Lamar, October 11, 1839, Lamar Papers, III, pp. 
126-128. 
4:6 Andreades, History .2.f. the Bank of England, p. 250. 
to further aggression by the United States into the Southwest. But 
Americans were immigrating into Texas in large numbers, and Texas was 
rapidly becoming United States oriented, thereby greatly reducing the 
chances for a Mexican reconquest of Texas. 
This new orientation brought up the question of annexation, which 
in 1838, was still unanswered for England. As far as Palmerston was 
able to determine, annexation, at least for the present, was a dead 
issue; but there was no assurance it would always remain so. Further-
more, British mills were dangerously low on raw materials, and almost 
totally dependent on the American southern states for cotton. The 
extension of slavery into Texas could provide England with an alternate 
supply of cotton in time; but if Palmerston recognized a Republic of 
Texas that included citizens who were slaveholders, he ran the risk of 
opposition from the anti-slavery forces in parliament. 
All this left Palmerston with two choices, recognition or maintain 
the status quo. If he chose recognition it could mean increased diffi-
culty in getting his programs through parliament. Besides, recognition 
of Texas would eliminate the possibility of Mexico and Texas reconciling 
their differences and re-uniting. Furthermore, such an action would 
anger the Mexicans and greatly reduce English bondholders chances of 
realizing any return on their investments in Mexico. Mexico was also 
considered as the spokesman for the Central American countries in the 
field of foreign affairs, and any lessening of British influences in 
Mexico would effect British influence in the other Central American 
countries. If, on the other hand, he chose to maintain the status quo, 
none of these issues would have to be confronted, at least not at the 
time being. Palmerston chose status quo. Thus, by keeping the British 
Government out of the dispute between Mexico and Texas in 1838, 
Palmerston hoped to maintain the balance of power in the Caribbean in 
favor of Great Britain. 47 
46 
By the spring of 1839, however, Palmerston decided that Mexico was 
unable to retake Texas, and that it was time to change his Caribbean 
policy. In a letter of instructions to Pakenham on April 25, 1839, 
Palmerston discussed at some length the question of Texas independence 
and seemed ready to grant her recognition. He also pointed out that 
Mexico should spend its energies in rendering productive the other 
portions of its vast territory making this its true domestic policy, 
with a foreign policy based on having Texas serve as a buffer state 
between Mexico and the United States. Here again, Palmerston was think-
ing only in the best interests of Great Britain. Should Texas remain 
independent, it would present an effective barrier to further expansion 
by tne United States into the Southwest. However, should the United 
States annex the Republic of Texas, a future possibility that Palmerston 
did not completely discount, then Mexico would continue to serve as the 
much needed barrier to American expansion. Palmerston advised Pakenham 
that al though he d1d not expect Mexico to consider recognizing the 
independence of Texas at this time, possibly Mexico would be willing to 
accept an offer by Great Britain to act as mediator in an attempt to 
48 bring peace to the area. 
47sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, The Cambridge History of British 
Foreign Policy 1783-1919, III (New York, 1922), II, p. 255. 
48Ephriam Douglass A.dams, British. Interests and Activities in 
Texas, 1836-1846 (Gloucester, 1963), pp. 29-31. 
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Soon after Pakenham received his instructions, there was a change 
in the Mexican Government, resulting in Pakenham being unable to present 
Palmerston's plan for over a month. He presented the plan to Juan 
caAedo, the new Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, who agreed the 
arguments were sound but urged that this matter not be brought up until 
such time as the new government was more firmly established.1±9 Pakenham 
was kept waiting for word to present his plan throughout the rest of the 
year, while the Mexican Government, like those of the past, held to a 
policy of non-recognition of Texas and constantly revised plans for the 
invasion and reconquest of Texas. Thus, when Hamilton had his inte~view 
with Palmerston in September 1839, while there was every indication 
Palmerston was ready to recognize the Republic of Texas, British foreign 
policy still dictated the time was not right to do so. 
During the time Hamilton was in London, he contacted several bank-
ing houses concerning the loan. He located several that expressed an 
interest, but only two gave any real promise; the money market in 
England was too unstable. One. firm, a Scottish banking house, was wil-
ling to accept the bond issue provided they had exclusive rights to the 
whole issue and could have fourteen days in which to return to Scotland 
and form a combination among Scotti'sh banks and bankers. The firm 
offered eighty cents on the dollar a.nd required a ten per cent commis-
sion. Hamilton turned down the offer as his instructions called for 
receiving par, or one hundred cents on the dollar. One other firm, 
headed by a Jewish Banker by the name of Goldsmith also offered to take 
1±9 . Ibid., pp. 32-JJ. 
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the issue, but here again with the problem of discount.50 
Although negotiations had begun with London banking firms, an 
acceptable offer would by no means assure Texas the loan. There were 
two primary reasons for this. First, the problem of recognition by 
the British Government still existed. The British Government could not 
allow Texas bonds to be bought and sold freely on the British money 
markets for this would be the same as recognizing the Republic of Texas. 
This fact did not seem to bother the Scottish banking firm that was 
ready to take the issue, or the Jewish banker. Evidently they both had 
means of transferring specie other than through the British money 
markets. Neither did it seem to bother Hamilton, but then he had good 
grounds for believing that recognition was all but an accomplished fact. 
The second problem involved the transfer of specie to Texas, once 
the loan was satisfactorily completed. England, at the time, was in the 
middle of an economic recession and the Bank of England was in financial 
distress. Its specie reserve was the lowest in the bank's history. 
London was now the capital of international money, and all specie (gold 
or silver), moving in or out of London, passed through the Bank of 
England. It also served as a central bank for all banking and money 
interests in England, and was the repository for all reserve specie. 
In addition, the Bank of England had possession of all Government funds 
and was responsible for management of the national·debt. 
Since all surplus Government funds remained'in the Bank of England, 
I 
the Chancellor of the'Exchequer had a g~eat responsibility to the 
British money market as well as to the Bank of England. His financial 
50 • : Hamilton to Lamar, October 11, 1839, Lamar Papers, III, pp. 126-
129. 
actions could contract or expand the money supply, which could directly 
influence investments and loans. He has to arrange the Government's 
finances so as to prevent money panics, rather than create them. At 
the same time, he had to aid the Bank of England in discharging its 
duties, not impede it. Together, with other cabinet members, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer formulates Government policy and is respon-
sible for seeing the funds required in foreign and domestic policies are 
available when needed. All this requires close cooperation and coordi-
nation between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Directors of the 
Bank of England. 
According to the rules under which the Bank of England was to con-
duct its business, it was required to keep a reserve, composed of bul~ 
lion and securities, equal to its liabilities. It was also required 
that, whether the demand comes from home or abroad, a metallic reserve 
equal to one=third the bank's liabilities must be maintained. 51 The 
Bank of England's directors frequently allowed these rules to be vio-
lated, particularly in years when crops were good and money moved in and 
out of the bank's vaults rapidly. 
The years 1833 through 1836 were good crop years in England, 
exports exceeded import~ and British investors were able to expand their 
investments, particularly in the United States. But the expansion of 
foreign investments called for exporting specie. Also, a large amount 
of American securities were sold in England to obtain gold. The gold 
was needed to carry out the financial reforms brought about by President 
Andrew Jackson's decision not to renew the charter of the United States 
51Andreades, History.£.£ the Bank of England, p. 264. 
50 
Bank in 1836. Still another exportation of gold reduced the specie 
level when two million pounds were sent to Ireland to prevent financial 
collapse resulting from the failure of the Agricultural and Commercial 
Bank. The Bank of England, which in the spring of 1836, had an eight 
million pound reserve, had only 3,6~0,000 pounds in reserve against 
liabilities of over thirty million pounds by the end of November, 
1836.52 
To stop the outward flow of gold, the Bank of England increased its 
discount rate of four and one-half per cent to five per cent, and 
finally refused to discount any bills previously discounted by an 
English bank. Since it was common practice for English banks to dis-
count American securities before placing them on the market, this action 
drove American securities from the market, as English banks liquidated 
their holdings. But this ·action resulted in gold being returned to 
England. The influx of gold continued throughout 1837. In December, 
the bank's metallic reserve was 10,500,800 pounds. By the following 
March, the bank's funds were once again in balance, with assets of 
10,527,000 pounds in coin and bullion, and 21,0~6,000 pounds in securi-
ties against liabilities of J1,57J,OOO pounds. 53 
A crop failure in 1838, caused England to import grain, with the 
Bank of England having to reduce its specie reserves by ten million 
pounds to pay for the imported grain. Crop failures on the continent 
also caused the drain of specie from those countries. The Bank of 
Belgium, in 1838, suspended payment to prevent bankruptcy, and the Bank 
52Ibid., p. 265. 
53rbid., pp. 266:...267. 
51 
of France borrowed from the Bank of England. At the same time, the Bank 
of England took an action that has been the subject of much controversy 
and many investigations by parliament. The discount rate of five per 
cent was lowere'd first to four per cent, and in November, 1838, to 
three and one-half per cent, causing gold to flow from its vaults. Not 
until the following May, did the bank change its policy and raise the 
discount rate to five per cent. When the discount rate was finally 
raised, the bank's metallic reserve amounted to slightly over four mil-
lion pounds, while its liabilities exceeded twenty-five million pounds. 
On July 16, 1839, the reserve had fallen to 2,987,000 pounds, and on 
the second of September, stood at 2,406,000 pounds, its lowest point.54 
Thus, the Bank of England was facing bankruptcy, when Hamilton was in 
England seeking a loan. The Bank of France came to the aid of the Bank 
of England and bankruptcy was prevented, but it was not until in 1843, 
that the bank's accounts were in balance once again. 
The financial conditions existing in England did not seem to con-
cern Hamilton greatly. He considered them as only a temporary condi-
tion, one that would correct itself in a short time, and still held high 
hopes the entire loan would soon be contracted. There was, however, a 
legal problem that could possibly hold up the loan, the wordage of the 
Sinking Fund Act, passed by the Texas Congress in January, 1839. The 
sinking fund had been created to insure that funds would be available 
to meet interest payments on the loan, but the act had failed to state 
explicitly who was to administer the fund, or to authorize the loan com-
missioners to receive funds and pay interest payments when they become 
Sl.t:Ibid., pp. 267-268. 
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due. In October, Hamilton left Burnley in England and hurried back to 
Texas to explain to the Congress the necessity of amending the Sinking 
Fund Act. Burnley, remained in England for a short time and then 
sailed for France, which had recognized the Republic of Texas in 
September, to see if the loan could be obtained from French financial 
interests. 
There were matters beside the sinking fund act that made it nee= 
essary for Hamilton to return to America. The United States Bank at 
Philadelphia expressed concern over the delay in negotiating a loan. 
The bank had advanced the Republic of Texas four hundred thousand dol= 
lars, contingent on Texas obtaining a loan in Europe, and reports coming 
out of Europe did not sound encouraging. Furthermore, there was a 
matter of some three hundred thousand dollars due Frederick Dawson of 
Baltimore, who was building ships for the Texas Navy. 
On November fourth, Hamilton wrote the president and directors of 
the bank, advising them of the loan's status. He also informed them of 
the three hundred thousand dollars due Dawson, and that unless he was 
paid by the first of December, his contr~ct read he was due double that 
amount. Hamilton then proposed he give his note as Commissioner of 
Loans for the Republic of Texas for the amount due Dawson. This note 
would be redeemable in ninety days and bore ten per cent interest. 
Payment was to be made in sterling on the London exchange. In event the 
loan was not completed within the ninety days, the bank was to receive 
double the amount of the n~t~. 55 F;vidently, Hamilton had no doubt of 
his ability to negotiate the loa.n in the. next ninety days. 
55Hamilton to Bank of United.States, November 4, 1839, TTP, I, 
PP• 431-432. 
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But there were others that did not feel this way. One of them was 
Samuel Roberts, Secretary of the Texas Legation in Washington. Writing 
to his father in October, Roberts went into much detail regarding the 
banks in the United States that had stopped specie payments, and the 
financial situation in England. He also observed that as far as the 
loan negotiations were concerned, he considered them a failure. 56 
Richard Dunlap, the Texas Minister to the United States, also be= 
lieved the-negotiations would be unsuccessful, that they had been ini= 
tiated at least six months too late. The directors of the United States 
Bank at Philadelphia must have also reached this conclusion. When 
Dunlap visited Baltimore in late November, he found no arrangements for 
paying Dawson in evidence. Dunlap was able to work out an agreement 
whereby Dawson received interest due on the contract, would receive the 
next six months interest in ninety days, and agreed to give Texas six 
months in which to redeem its bonds. 57 
Lamar did not feel this pessimistic, however. In his annual mes-
sage to Congress on November 12, 1839, he dealt lightly with financial 
matters. He also pointed out that the national debt was comparatively 
small, still it would be necessary to lay out large sums for the Navy 
and the military posts to defend the frontier. As for the prospects of 
obtaining the five million dollar loan, Lamar considered them highly 
satisfactory. He called attention to the fact the commissioners had 
obtained an advance on the loan, which netted the Republic two hundred 
eighty thousand dollars. This was from the four hundred thousand 
56 Roberts to Roberts, October 12, 1839, Lamar Papers, III, p. 131. 
57 Dunlap to Starr, December 18, 1839, TTP, I, pp. 336-338. 
dollars Hamilton had obtained from Biddle, and was supposed to have 
been kept secret until the loan was negotiated. Lamar informed the 
Congress that Hamilton had stated that.current conditions on the 
European money markets was the only reason the loan had not already 
58 been procured. 
Lamar was so confident of Hamilton's eventual success that on 
December twenty-third, he vetoed a joint resolution of the Texas 
Congress instructing the loan commissioners to contract for a loan of 
51± 
which only one-fifth would be received at the time .of contracting. The 
remaining four-fiiths· could be received in either four annual or eight 
semi-annual payments. In his veto message, Lamar declared that it was 
doubtful anyone would be willing to loan money whereby they obligated 
themselves to receive bonds five years hence at a price set now. Any~ 
way, he noted, two hundred eighty thousand of the one million dollars 
received the first year would have to be paid out at once to repay money 
already advanced, leaving less than seven hundred and fifty thousand on 
which to run the government, an amount he considered inadequate. More-
over, there was a good possibility that five years from now, Texas would 
be in a position to loan money instead of borrowing capita1.59 Just how 
Lamar planned to pay off a four hundred thousand dollar advance with 
only two hundred and eighty thousand dollars is extremely interesting, 
but he fails to discuss the matter further. 
Thus, the Lamar administration ended its first year in office with 
high hopes and confidence in the future; but no loan to stabilize the 
58Lamar Papers, III, pp. 168-169. 
59Lamar Papers, III, pp. 207~209. 
55 
nation°s economy and end its financial woes. The public debt, which was 
$886,425 at the beginning of the year, had increased to $3,855,900, and 
the amount of treasury notes in circulation had increased from $684,069 
to $2,013,762. But where the notes had been worth eighty cents on the 
dollar at the first of the year, they now were worth only twenty~five 
cents on the dollar at the year's end. During the year, revenue 
amounted to only $187, 791 while expenditures totaled $1,504, 173. Thus, 
it is difficult to understand how the administration could look forward 
to its second year in office with any degree of confidence and 
t o o 60 op imism. 
60Miller, A Financial History of Texas, p. 391, Gouge, The Fiscal 
History of Texa;, p. 269. 
CHAPTER III 
t8W: THREE TREATIES WITH GREAT BRITAIN, 
BUT NO LOAN 
After Hamilton had discussed the need for changes in the Sinking 
Fund Act with the Texas Congress, he started back to the east coast 
during the last week in December. While awaiting passage in New 
Orleans, he wrote Secretary of the Treasury, James Starr, his thoughts 
about a national bank for Texas. A national bank, Hamilton believed, 
was an absolute necessity to Texas, for it would provide the Republic 
with an institution in which all functions of finance, governmental and 
public, could be combined. In this, he was thinking of a bank along 
the lines of the Bank of England, one that was a repository for all 
specie, securities, and other types of money as well as a bank of issue 
responsible for managing all aspects of governmental finance. Lamar had 
suggested such a bank in his first message to Congress in 1838. But 
such a bank could not operate with9ut specie. As matters now stood, the 
proposed loan was the only immediate source of specie, and Hamilton 
cautioned the Legislature ~hould not take any action regarding the bank 
until the results of his trip to Europe.were known. 1 
While in New Orleans, Hamilton received word from Pakenham, the 
British Minister in Mexico, concerning his attempts to mediate the 
1Harnilton to Starr, January 3, 18W, TTP, I, pp. 355-356. 
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dispute between Mexico and the Republic of Texas. The Mexican Govern-
ment continued to turn down his offer to act as mediator, Pakenham in~ 
formed Hamilton. But after many communications and discussions, he was 
able to get a communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
,. 
Canedo, stating that the Mexican Government was willing to listen to 
proposals from the inhabitants of Texas, provided nothing in the pro-
posals touched on Mexico's sovereignty over Texas. Replying to 
Pakenham, Hamilton stated that Texas was not willing to enter into any 
discussions with Mexico except through the mediation by Great Britain. 
Also, that any peace would have to include the territory and boundaries 
Texas had defined, and for which it was willing to pay. Furthermore, 
he had been appointed as Commissioner for the purpose of treating with 
the English bondholders, and to accept the mediation of the British 
Government in the dispute with Mexico. Reminding Pakenham that five 
million dollars were at stake, Hamilton told Pakenham it was left up 
to him to decide whether the five million dollars were worth saving for 
the English bondholders. Trying further to put additional pressure on 
Pakenham, Hamilton also advised him that should the Mexican Government 
decline mediation by the British Government and the British Government 
still continue its policy of non-recog11ition of the Republic of Texas, 
he would be forced to turn to France and attempt to negotiate a loan 
2 there. 
In the meantime, Treat, the Republic's special and confidential 
agent to Mexico, was attempting to make 1 cbntact with the Mexican author-
ities so he could press the Texas plan for settling its dispute with 
2 .' I 
Pakenham to Hamilton, December 12, 1839; Hamilton to Pakenham, 
January 2, 1840, DC, I, PP• 8$7-871. 
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Mexico. Treat had arrived in Vera Cruz the previous November, but due 
to internal unrest in Mexico, made no attempt to reveal himself. The 
unrest was over the Battle of Alcantro on October 3, 1839. In the 
battle, a force of Mexican Federalist troops together with a group of 
Texasns, under the command of Colonels Reuben Ross ands. W. Jordan, 
defeated a force of Mexican Government troops. Alcantro was on the 
Mexican side of the Rio Grande. This action caused the Mexican Govern-
ment to actively prepare for an offensive campaign against Texas. On 
January 1, 1840, the Mexican President, Anastasio Bustamante, in his 
annual message to Congress, expressed concern over the Battle of 
Alcantro and urged the Congress to pass laws needed to continue the war 
against Texas. 3 It was against this background that Treat arrived in 
Mexico. 
Soon after arriving in Mexico City, Treat contacted Pakenham, but 
it was not until February 1, 1840, that Pakenham was able to arrange an 
interview for Treat with Ca8edo. Catedo informed Treat he had encoun-
tered great difficulty in obtaining permission to meet with him, and 
that it was only because of Pakenham's intervention with the President 
that he was able to do so. During the interview, it was discovered 
A Treat's credentials were only written instructions, and Canedo asked 
4 for formal credentials before proceeding any further. 
While waiting for his credentials, Treat, on March first, submitted 
a format for a treaty, which included the Texas demands for the resto-
ration of peace and the recognition of Texas with boundaries as defined 
3christian, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, pp. 145-147. 
4Ibid., p. 148. 
by its Congress. Treat received his credentials on April fifteenth, 
" and presented them to Canedo three days later, at which time an agree-
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ment was reached on how to present Treat's plan to the Mexican Congress. 
On May fifth, the Mexican Cabinet asked for all papers, documents, and 
correspondence to be submitted to a "Council of Government" for study. 
After studying the papers, they were submitted, along with the Council's 
recommendations 1 to the Congress on July third. But before the papers 
and recommendations could be considered, one of the periodic revolutions 
broke out in Mexico City and nothing came of the plan. 5 
Lamar was becoming impatient at the delays encountered by Treat. 
Furthermore, public sentiment in Texas was calling for action. On 
March twenty-seventh, Treat notified the Texas Government he had for,-
mally laid before the Mexican Government a proposal for peace. In 
replying to this letter, Abner S. Lipscomb, the Secretary of State, 
wrote Treat on May seventh, that if after he had handed his credentials 
to the Mexican Government and received no favorable response to the 
Texas plan for peace within a reasonable period of time, he was to 
withdraw. Also, if it was necessary for him to withdraw, he was to 
notify.Pakenham that Texas would have to change its position and com-
mence offensive operations against Mexico. Furthermore, these opera-
tions would not be for the purpose of extending Texas territory beyond 
the Rio Grande, and any occupation beyond the river would be temporary 
and solely for the purpose of forcing peace with Mexico. 6 
In June, the threat of a Mexican blockade of the Texas ports caused 
5Ibid., 148-149. 
6 Ibid.; Lipscomb to Treat, ·May 7, 1840, DC, II, p. 635. 
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Lamar to dispatch the Texas Navy on a cruise of the Gulf of Mexico. The 
Navy commander, E.W. Moore, was instructed to proceed to an anchorage 
off Vera Cruz and await word from Treat. By the middle of August, Treat 
still had received no word concerning his proposal. On August twenty-
first, he addressed a long communication to caAedo, calling attention 
to the many complaints Texas had against Mexico. Receiving no reply to 
his communication, Treat addressed still another letter to the Mexican 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that if he had received 
no reply to his proposal by the eighteenth of September, it would be 
necessary for him to ask for his passports and withdraw. Again no 
reply, and on September twenty-first, Treat wrote caAedo requesting his 
passports. A Hoping to stall off Treat's departure, Canedo finally agreed 
that if Treat had authority to agree to an armistice, the Mexican 
Government was ready to receive his proposal. Accordingly, Treat drew 
up a plan that called for cession of hostilities for three or four 
years, with a six-month notice before hostilities could be renewed. The 
Rio Grande was set as the boundary between Mexico and the Republic of 
A On September twenty-ninth, Canedo sent Treat's passports by Texa·s. 
Pakenham without mentioning the proposal. 7 
On October fifteenth, Pakenham informed Treat, who had gone to 
Vera Cruz and was waiting there in case there was any change in the 
Mexican Government's position, that the Mexican Government refused to 
consider any proposal for an armistice that included a boundary line 
south of the San Antonio niver, which passed through the City of San 
Antonio and reaches·the Gulf of Mexico about midway between the present 
7christian, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, pp. 150-151· 
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day cities of Corpus Christi and Galveston. Furthermore, there was 
nothing that could be gained at this time by Treat remaining in Mexico. 
Treat, who had been ill for some time, was unable to leave Mexico immed-
iately and did not embark on a Texas ship until late November. En route 
to Texas, Treat died on November JO, 181±0, and could not make his offi-
cial report of his attempt to negbtiate a peace with Mexico. 8 The 
second attempt by Lamar to conclude a peace with Mexico had also ended 
in failure. 
After notifying Pakenham of his commission to treat with the 
English bondholders and to accept the mediation of the British Govern-
ment in the dispute between Mexico and the Republic of Texas, Hamilton 
journeyed on to his home in Charlestown, South Carolina. While he was 
en route, the Texas Congress amended the Sinking Fund Act. The Act now 
specified that the loan commissioners, Hamilton and Burnley, were autho-
rized to receive and payout the annual interest of three hundred 
thousand dollars, to such agents in London, Paris, Amsterdam, or wher-
ever the loan was negotiated, and to pay dividends on the bonds given 
as security for the loan. 9 
While at home, Hamilton began to have qoubts of being able to ob-
tain the loan in England. During the month of February, he wrote James 
Starr, the Secretary of the Treasury, three long letters expressing this 
doubt and the possibility that negotiations would have to be switched 
to France. In the first letter on February fifth, Hamilton was greatly 
concerned over the state of the money markets in England and concluded 
8Ibid., p. 1.52. 
9 . 
Gammel, ~ Laws .2f Texas,; 1822-1897, II, p. 2.30. 
that until such time as the English bondholders decided to put pressure 
on the British Government, there was little chance of procuring a loan 
in England. He also cautioned Starr, that Saligny, who was now the 
French Charge d'Affaires to the Republic of Texas, should be conciliated 
in every way possible just in case it was necessary to negotiate the 
loan in France. One of the first things that Lamar should consider, 
Hamilton declared, was reducing the tariffs on French wines. Further-
more, Hamilton continued, should England continue refusing to recognize 
Texas and Mexico continue refusing to make peace, if the French were 
offered concessions, such as a half interest in the San Saba mines, 
French capital might be induced to come to the aid of Texas. 10 (The San 
Saba mines to which Hamilton refers are located in the vicinity of 
Santa Fe, New Mexico. Under the Texas boundaries, as defined by the 
Texas Congress, this area was a part of the territory claimed by the 
Republic of Texas.) 
Five days later, Hamilton again wrote Starr. This time it was to 
inform him the State of Pennsylvania had failed to meet interest on its 
bonds in Europe and without question this action would have an adverse 
effect on any loan negotiations in England. Thus, he now considered it 
highly important that thought be given to seeking a loan in France. 
Hamilton also asked for a commission allowing him to pledge the bonds 
11 for an advance on the loan. The pledge was approved and forwarded to 
him. 
On the twenty-fourth, Hamilton wrote Starr once again. By now he 
10Hamilton to Starr, February 5, 184:0, TTP, I, pp. 377-378. 
11Hamilton to Starr, February 13, 18l.t:o, TTP, I, pp. J83-,J8l.t:. 
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was fully convinced France was the only place a loan could be negotiated 
under existing financial conditions. Due to the unprecedented scarcity 
of money in England, Hamilton continued, it would be months before the 
financial situation in England corrected itself, and until then, England 
could not be persuaded to bring pressure on Mexico to accept mediation. 
Hamilton evidently still hoped that somehow Mexico could be forced to 
recognize Texas, thus opening the way for the British Government to 
follow suit. He reminded Starr to be sure the Texas Navy remained in 
port until results of the negotiations in Europe were known to the 
Texas Government. Any overt act by the Texas Government, Hamilton 
believed, would endanger the prospects for a peace with Mexico and also 
b d t . t 1 t th 1 t• t• 12 e e rimen a o e oan nego ia ions. 
Hamilton had not entirely given up hope of a loan being negotiated 
in England. On February tenth, he wrote Palmerston of his authority to 
accept mediation by the British Government, in case Mexico concurred, 
and also of his appointment as agent to treat with the English bond-
holders, in the event the Mexican Government agreed to the five million 
dollars, the Republic of Texas was willing to pay for the disputed 
territory, being paid to her creditors in England. Hamilton also dis-
cussed his correspondence with Pakenham relative to the truce offer of 
the Mexican Government. Even though the Mexican 'Government was willing 
to conclude a truce with Texas for an indefinite period, Hamilton told 
Palmerston, he had turned the offer down, unless the Mexican Government 
was willing to accept the mediation of the British Government, and 
transfer the negotiations to London. By now it was evident that 
12Hamilton to St~rr, February 2~, 18~0~ TTP, I, pp. 390-393. 
6'-.i: 
Hamilton was doing everything he could to hold the five million dollars 
as bait to pressure the British Government into forcing the Mexican 
Government to accept mediation. If, however, Mexico should change her 
position and decide to accept the offer, Hamilton indicated the Republic 
of Texas would consent to an armistice until April 18'-.i:1. On the other 
hand, if Mexico declined the offer, then from the first of June on, 
there was little question that conditions in Mexico would not be to the 
best interests of Mexico or Great Britain. 13 For the first time, 
Hamilton voiced the threat of force against Mexico, something he was 
counseling the Republic of Texas not to do, because of its possible 
effect on the loan negotiations. 
Sometime in the spring of 18'-.i:O, Palmerston must have decided to 
recognize the Republic of Texas. Just when the decision was made is not 
known, neither are the exact reasons for this action entirely clear. 
That the United States and France had recognized the Republic of Texas 
no doubt had some influence on his decision. He was also aware that 
Hamilton was in the process of negotiating a treaty with the Nether;. 
lands. Should this treaty be negotiated, and it was on September 17, 
18'-.i:O, this would open a second competitive European outlet to Texas 
goods and Texas trade. Neither could he rule out annexation of Texas by 
the United States, something the British Government wanted very much to 
prevent, as it would expand the United States deeper into the Caribbean. 
Thus, if England wanted to continue its present degree of influence and 
continue to increase its trade with the Caribbean region, including 
13Hamil ton to Palmerston, February 10, 18'-.i:O, DC, II, pp. 887-889. 
Texas, the time had come for England to recognize the Republic of Texas, 
despite possible opposition from the anti-slavery forces in parliament. 14 
On February 15, 181,i..o, Palmerston notified Pakenham of his decision. 
At the same time, he instructed Pakenham to press claims for the two 
English ships, the Little Penn and the Eliza Russell, which had been 
captured by the Texas Navy in the summer of 1837. The Little Penn was 
--. 
the property of Lizardi and Company. En.route to Me:it:ico, the ship had 
run aground and ships of the Texas Navy salvaged its' cargo. The Lizardi 
Company submitted claims in the amount of 3,61,i..o pounds to the British 
Government. The Eliza Russell was a British schooner bound from Liver-
pool to Sisal, Mexico~ when captured and sent to the Texas port of 
Galveston as a prize ship. The ship was l~ter released, but her captain 
claimed damages of 865 pounds for· his detention. 15 
Palmerston had presented these cl.aims in 1838, and again in 1839. 
When presenting the· claims in 1839, \he included a comment regarding 
Englishmen whose land had been taken away from them in territory now 
claimed by the Republic of Tex.as, and hoped that Texas would restore 
these .lands. Lamar made these claims the subject of a Special Message 
to the Texas Congress on January 8, 18/,i-O. Takingq> the matter of the 
claims against the Texas Navy, Lamar pointed out that former President 
Houston had acknowledged the validity of the claims for the schooner 
' Eliza Russell; therefore, there could be no question regarding these 
14J. L. Worley, "The Diplomatic Relations of England and the 
Republic of Texas, 11 Soutliwestern··Histo:dc.al · Quarterly, XI, Utily·; 
1905), P• 13. . 
15Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1836-1846, 
p. 34. 
claims. However, Lamar made no provisions for paying the claims and 
final settlement was not made until 1843. 16 
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As to the c~aims of Lizardi and Company, Lamar stated that pres-
ently there was insufficient documentation on which to make a realistic 
evaluation of the claims. Then, taking up the matter of land lost by 
Englishmen, Lamar declared that he had never heard of any such persons, 
and therefore, must assume Palmerston was referring to persons who once 
held empresario grants or contracts for colonization with the Mexican 
Government. If this was the case, then such contracts or grants were 
now a matter for the Texas Government to decide; and in this matter, 
Texas would not allow any foreign government to interfere in their 
adjustments. 17 
In accordance with his instructions, Pakenham forwarded to Treat, 
who was still in Mexico at this time, several documents listing the 
British Government's claims related to the Little Penn, and also addi-
itional documents concerning lands claimed by British subjects. Treat 
transmitted the documents to Texas in April, but not until June sixth 
did Lipscomb, the Secretary of State; reply to Pakenham. Calling atten-
tion to the empresario contracts under which the lands were claimed, 
Lipscomb pointed out that according to Mexican law, only residents of 
Mexico could have these contracts. Therefore, only one of the claims 
was valid, and the Republic of Texas had made provisions whereby the 
claimant would receive just compensation. As for the other claims, he 
continued, they were highly questionable, for there was no evidence that 
16Ibid.; Lamar Papers, III, PP• 303-304. 
17 Lamar Papers, III, pp. 303-304. 
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the claimants had ever been Mexican citizens. The claims of Lizardi 
and Company would need further investigation;: particularly the circum-
stance surrounding the capture, declared Lipscomb. There was a question 
of just what flag the Little Penn was flying at the time of capture, 
British or Mexican. He then suggested the whole matter be turned over 
to an agent in New Orleans to investigate. 18 The claims of the Little 
Penn were never forcibly pressed by the British Government, and seem to 
have been more of a formality to satisfy Lizardi and Company. 
That Palmerston did not insist on pressing the claims is no doubt 
due to his desire to maintain the good relations between Great Britain 
and Texas. British influence was at an all time high, but conditions in 
Texas were changing rapidly. For some time now, there had been growing 
unrest over the policies of the Lamar administration. Annexation was 
once again being discussed in Texas. The citizens of Texas were greatly 
concerned over the inability of the present government to solve the 
R~public's financial difficulties, while at the same time, it continued 
with a policy of expansion that called for more and more money. The 
value of Texas money continued to depreciate, worth at the best no more 
than twenty cents on the dollar, in some areas of Texas-even less. 19 
The Republic of Texas was fast approaching a financial crossroad, one 
that required immediate attention. 
The majority of Texas people had the same high hopes for the 
Republic held by the Lamar administration in 1838. They favored rejec-
tion of annexation and believed the.five million dollar loan would be 
18 - /_r, Pakenham to Treat, April 26, 18'±\.J; Treat to Lipscomb, April 29, 
184:o; Lipscomb to Pakenham, June 6, 18~0, DC, I, pp. 891~900. 
19Gouge, The Fiscal History of Texas, p. 269. 
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contracted, thus, restoring the Republic's finances. By the spring of 
184-0, disillusionment with the Government's fiscal policies had set in. 
Texas money continued to depreciate as the treasury department con-
tinued to print money against an empty treasury. Governmental expenses 
were climbing rapidly, while at the same time, the imbalance in foreign 
exchange continued to spiral as imports continued to exceed exports. 
The loan still hadn't been completed. Talk was now being heard question-
ing the advisability of continuing to rely on the possibility of a loan, 
or whether it might be better to think once again of annexation as the 
better means of correcting the financial distress of the Texas people 
and their government. 
All this unrest brought Lamar to the defense of his administration. 
Taking his case to the people in two letters of May twenty-eighth and 
June second, Lamar discussed the State of the Republic at great length. 
He challenged the opposition to support their charges of extravagance, 
that the people of Texas were able to distinguish between useful and 
wasteful expenditures, between honest and corrupt use of government 
funds. As for the depreciation of Texas money, he continued, this was 
not due to any fault or defect on the administration's part, rather it 
was the result of the conditions of the time. The government had done 
its best in this matter, Lamar contended, it did not have the power to 
compel foreign capitalists to loan their surplus funds. Still it is 
only a matter of time until the government resolves the financial dis-
tress of the Republic and its people, Lamar declared. Furthermore, as 
Lamar pointed out, a financial condition such as was presently plaguing 
the Republic was not unusual for a new country.. The United States had 
made use of paper money when it first began, and paper money had solved 
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the problem there. Thus, there was no reason to doubt the ultimate 
redemption of Texas money at par value and quite likely in the not so 
distant future, for the prospects of a loan were still excellent. As 
to the imbalance in foreign trade, this, too, was just a normal situa-· 
tion for a young nation and would correct itself in time as the country 
20 
was able to increase its exports. Nowhere in these letters did Lamar 
give any indication his administration was having second thoughts about 
its position on annexation. 
Meanwhile, Hamilton and Burnley had returned to Europe in late May. 
Arriving in England, they found the money market very depressed and left 
for the continent, Hamilton for Holland and Belgium, and Burnley for 
France. Hamilton concluded a treaty with Holland in September and began 
negotiations with Belgium. Burnley, however, was unable to make any 
progress on a loan in France. France was occupied with the prospects of 
a war with England. 
'!hey met back in England and on October third, wrote a progress 
report to Secretary of the Treasury, James Starr. Upon their arrival in 
England, they found the money market much depressed, the best American 
securities were being sold for seventy-five to eighty cents on the 
dollar. Furthermore, there was an abolitionist convention in London at 
the time, and it was attacking any part of the world in which slavery 
still existed. Therefore,- to have attempted to force Texas securities 
on the market could have easily led, to their being rejected. 21 
' I' As to the conditions in France, the report continued, Burnley had 
20 Lamar Papers, III, PP• 393-405. 
21Hamilton and Burnley to Starr, October 3, 1840, TTP, II, pp. 
550-552. 
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explored the possibility of the French Government making an advance on 
the bonds in return for certain commercial considerations, but found 
all France was involved in preparing for a possible war with England 
over the Near East settlement of 1839, which had reduced French influ-
ences in that area, and kept France out of Egypt. In view of this, it 
was quite likely several months would pass before the French Government 
ld b h d ·d· th th t f f d d · kl 22 cou e approac e , provi ing e rea o war a e quic y. 
By the time they returned to England the first of October~ condi-
tions in England had changed. The previous gloomy forecast of a poor 
crop had been dispelled, the crops were unusually good. This resulted 
in a more favorable balance of trade for England and creating optimism 
among the bankers. Thus, if there was no war, on which there were di- · · 
vided opinions, it was almost certain that a one~half million dollar 
advance would be negotiated within the next thirty days, provided Texas 
took no offensive measures against Mexico. The success of their mis-
sion, they re-emphasized to Starr, depended on Texas keeping the peace. 
All offensive actions must be originated by Mexico. Furthermore, in 
Europe, the mere rumor of war could reduce the price of securities as 
much as twenty per cent. Presently, there was a rumor going around 
Europe that Texas intended to attack Matamoras, thus, it was up to the 
Texas Government as to what it wanted, Matamoras or'a loan. 23 
Hamilton and Burnley were highly confident of negotiating the loan 
and .began thinking of a loan in excess of five million dollars. In 
order to determine if they could legally contract for a loan of as much 
• 22Ibid. 
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as seven million dollars, they had the Solicitor of the Bank of England, 
James Freshfield, examine the loan acts. In his opinion, Freshfield set 
five million dollars as the amount the loan commissioners had authority 
to contract for. Then he took up the problem of recognition, pointing 
out that since the Republic of Texas was not recognized by the British 
Government, Texas securities could not be dealt with as valid securities 
on the British money markets until such time as the British Government 
. d T 24 recognize exas. 
In the meantime, The British Government had been reviewing its 
policy toward the Republic of Texas. Palmerston was at last convinced 
that Mexico had no intention of negotiating with Texas and any further 
delay by England in recognizing Texas was not in the best interests of 
Great Britain. Hamilton had recently completed a treaty with Holland 
and was currently bargaining for a treaty with Belgium, which if sue-
cessful, would bring to three the number of European nations recognizing 
the independence of Texas. Thus, if England wished to continue exer-
cising the influence it presently had in the Caribbean, it could no 
longer afford to delay the recognition of Texas. 
Negotiations for a treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of 
Texas were begun. On October 18, 181±0, Palmerston sent the draft of a 
treaty of commerce and navigation to Hamilton. Under the terms of the 
Treaty, Great Britain would recognize the independence of Texas as being 
~ facto, or fully established. The treaty would also give security to 
all commercial intercourse between the two nations. 25 
2%reshfield to Shaw, October 29, 1840; TTP, II, pp© 559-561 .. 
25 
"Slavery," British Parliamentary Papers. 
1969), XX; p., 68~ 
VC (Shannon, 
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But the Republic of Texas would not receive recognition by the 
British Government so easily. Palmerston then advised Hamilton that 
Her Majesty's Government would not acknolwedge any new nation unless a 
treaty for the suspension of the African slave trade was also included. 
This was the concession necessary to appease the anti-slavery forces. 
Commenting further on the issue of slave trade and slavery, Palmerston 
informed Hamilton the British Government was well well aware of the 
number of people in Texas who had come from the United States and might 
be against the concession of mutual right of search,required by the 
African Slave Trade Treaty. Therefore, to be sure there was no mis-
understanding, the right of search, currently the subject of a discus-
sion between Great Britain and the United States, and the right of 
search in the proposed treaty for the suppression of African slave 
trade, were two different things. The right of search being discussed 
by Great Britain and the United States involved a wartime right to check 
for deserters from the naval service, while the right of search in the 
African Slave Trade Treaty was the right to search merchant vessels sus-
pected of engaging in slave trade. Furthermore, the proposed treaty 
stipulated that vessels found trafficking in the African slave trade 
were to be turned over to the country in which the ship was registered 
for legal action against the ship's owner. As for the issue of slavery, 
Palmerston noted, the proposed treaty said nothing about the question of 
slavery, thus, the Republic of Texas could deal with slavery within its 
b d ' ' •t• f't 26 oun aries as 1 saw 1 • · 
In his reply on October twentieth, Hamilton reminded Palmerston the 
26Ibid., pp, 68-69. 
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Constitution of the Republic of Texas prohibited African slave trade and 
therefore, he anticipated no difficulty in having the treaty approved. 
But as for slavery, Hamilton admitted that persons emigrating from the 
United States had brought their domestic slaves with them, which he 
contended, were needed to cultivate the hot, humid delta regions along 
the Texas rivers. Thus, while Texas was against African slave trade, 
1.•t t . t 1 27 was no aga1.ns s avery. 
There still remained the matter of mediation by the British Govern-
ment in the dispute between Mexico and Texas. Hamilton had written 
Palmerston in February of his appointment as agent to accept mediation 
by the British Government and also was authorized to treat with the 
English bondholders. At that time, Ralmerston did not want to consent 
to Great Britain taking sides in the boundary dispute between Mexico 
and the Republic of Texas. By November, however, conditions had 
changed, and Great Britain was now ready to recognize the Republic of 
Texas. This would definitely affect relations between Great Britain 
and Mexico, but Palmerston was confident the British Government would 
still be able to carry out the proposed mediation. But Texas was not to 
have British mediation without paying for it. Palmerston proposed to 
Hamilton Texas should assume that portion of the Mexican debt, which 
Mexico had guaranteed by land now in the disputed area between the two 
rivers, in return for mediation by the British Government. 
In his reply of November fifth, Hamilton informed Palmerston Texas 
could in no way be considered.liable for any portion of the Mexican 
debt. Besides, there was no precedent under international law whereby 
27Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
Texas could be found liable. However, Great Britain was offering her 
good services in an attempt to bring about peace between Mexico and 
Texas, therefore, Texas was willing to make a concession, but wanted it 
understood the concession was a voluntary one. If Mexico was willing to 
consent to a truce with Texas within thirty days of the receipt of a 
proposal for a truce, and would agree to concluding a treaty of amity 
and commerce in six months that provided boundaries satisfactory and 
well-defined between the two countries, Texas was willing to assume one 
million pounds sterling of the Mexican public debt, contracted prior to 
28 the year 1835. 
This proposal was acceptable to Palmerston and in the first part of 
November, three treaties were drawn up. Palmerston and Hamilton signed 
the first treaty on November thirteenth. The treaty covered commerce, 
navigation, and trade relations between the two countries. The second 
treaty, signed one day later, was a convention stipulating the portion 
of the Mexican debt Texas would accept, providing the British Government 
was successful in its mediation attempt. The amount of the Mexican debt 
Texas agreed to assume coincided with the amount Hamilton previously 
suggested to Palmerston, one million pounds sterling. On November 
sixteenth, the third treaty was signed. This treaty provided for the 
suppression of African slave trade and for mutual right of search. 
Palmerston, suspecting there might be a delay in ratification of the 
third treaty, stipulated the exchange of ratifications was to be in 
London within six months, and not until all three treaties had been 
28 . . ,.~ Hamilton to Palmerston, November 5, 18':l:U, DC, I, pp. 909-910. 
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ratified would Great Britain accord official recognition of the Republic 
of Texas. 29 
On December third, Hamilton dispatched three treaties to Texas by 
special messenger. One was the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the 
Government of Holland; the other two, the first and second treaty with 
Great Britain. He did not, however, send the treaty for the suppression 
of African slave trade, dispatching this treaty one month later, with a 
long and detailed explanation of the reasons for his signing this par-
ticular treaty. The first two treaties with Great Britain reached Texas 
in time to be ratified by the Texas Senate in January 1841, but the 
third treaty did not reach Texas before the Legislature had recessed 
for the summer. 
The time for exchanging ratifications was extended first to June 1, 
1842, and then later to August 1, 1842. Finally on February 8, 1842, 
Hamilton notified Aberdeen, who had replaced Palmerston as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, that ratifications were on the way to London. At last, 
Texas bonds would have legal standing in the British money markets and 
the way was open to negotiate the long desired loan, but the Lamar 
administration had ended in December, 1841.30 
At the same time the treaties were sent to Texas, letters were also 
dispatched to Lamar and Secretary of the Treasury James Starr. In the 
letter to Starr, Hamilton and Burnley advised him there was no assurance 
the negotiations could be completed before the next ship left England on 
29siegel, A Political History of~ Texas Republic, 1836-1845, 
P• 150. 
JOHamilton to Lipscomb, December 3, 184o, DC, I, PP• 907-919; 
British Parliamentary Papers, XX!, p. 151; XXIV, p. 320. 
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I 
January 4, 1841. Furthermore, American securities were still badly 
depressed and scarce money was keeping the interest rate as high as 
twelve per cent. On the other hand, the prospects for war in Europe 
were diminishing daily and gold was returning to England, correcting the 
balance of exchange and relieving pressure on the Bank of England. 
Thus, they believed that in a short time confidence would be restored 
to the capitalists of Europe, and by early spring there should be no 
doubt of obtaining the loan. But in a letter to Lamar, Hamilton told a 
different story. He was highly optimistic the loan negotiations could 
be concluded no later than January first, enabling Burnley to return to 
31 Texas with the money on the January boat. 
Since there was little doubt Starr would advise Lamar of any corre-
spondence he received from the loan commissioners, it is difficult to 
understand why the conflicting information was sent. That Lamar was 
having trouble with the Texas Legislature was well-known. Possibly, 
Hamilton felt the necessity of keeping Lamar's hopes high regarding the 
long sought loan, and in this way, give him support in his fight with 
the Texas Congress. 
In November, it had been necessary for Lamar to go before the Texas 
Congress and deliver a State of the Republic address. Discussing the 
status of the Republic's fiscal affairs, Lamar pointed out that during 
the past year the entire expenditures of the Government would have 
amounted to about four.hundred thousand dollars, had Texas money been 
at par. But Texas money was not at par, and the Congress was required 
to appropriate two million dollars in bonds, or five times what would 
31ifamilton to Lamar and Hamilton and Burnley to Starr, December 3, 
1840, DC, I, pp. 914-915; 920-921. 
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have been necessary. Furthermore, as the population of the Republic 
increased, government expenditures would continue to increase, driving 
the value of Texas money still lower, unless prompt action was taken to 
restore the currency to its proper value. Under present conditions, a 
loan was the only hope Texas had of restoring the value of its money, 
thus, a loan was an absolute necessity to the Republic's good health and 
well-being. As for the prospects for a loan, he still considered them 
excellent. However, as matters now stood, Lamar continued: 
We cannot raise our, depreciated paper to the metallic stan-
dard, nor can we shortly arrest the serious losses which 
the Government is daily sustaining from that depreciation. 
Neither shall we have it in our power to satisfy the semi 
annual demands of interest accruing or our funded debt and 
circulating bonds; and still less able shall we be to re-
store with that punctuality which honor may require, the 
advance already made to this Government and procured by our 
Commissioners upon the strength of their individual credit 
and responsibilities. Under these conditions, I could not 
fail to view with regret,, the adoption of any measure by 
Congress which would endanger or defeat any negotiation, the 
success of which is so necessar; to the maintenance of our 
national character and credit.3 
The Texas Congress, as well as the people of the Republic, had now begun 
to question a loan as being the panacea for Texas financial 
difficulties. 
The Lamar administration closed its second year in office, as it 
had its first, still seeking the one big loan needed to bring financial 
stability to the Republic of Texas. During the year, the Republic's 
public debt had increased to $6,241,409, an increase of $2,385,500. The 
amount of treasury notes in circulation had increased from $2,013,762 
to $3,287,962 while at the same time their value had dropped to sixteen 
32 Lamar Papers, I, p. 466. 
and two~thirds cents on the dollar, a fifty per cent drop from the 
beginning of the year. Revenue for the year amounted to $~53,235, 
while gO'\rernment expenditures totaled $2, 17~, 752. Furthermore, the 
treasury was empty.33 
33Miller, A Financial History ..2.£ Texas, p. 391; Gouge, The Fiscal 
History of Texas, p. 269. 
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CHAPTER IV 
18~1: THE YEAR OF DISILLUSIONMENT 
The Lamar administration began its third and final year in office 
with guarded optimism for the future. However, the long sought and 
desperately needed loan was still as illusive as ever. Hamilton and 
Burnley remained in Europe, attempting to obtain a loan in England, 
France, Holland, Belgium, or wherever there might be a chance. The 
Republic's public debt continued to climb and the value of its money 
continued to depreciate. The Texas Congress was becoming very reluctant 
to pass appropriations needed by the administration to conduct its 
day-to~day business. Pessimism was rap1dly replacing the optimism of 
the past, and public opinion was daily becoming more critical of the 
administration and its attempts to solve the nation's financial dilemma. 
Talk was heard more frequently that the loan was not the way to bring 
financial stability to the Republic, but a return to the conservative 
policies of the past. The word annexation was also coming up more often 
in conversations. But this was not all the Lamar administration had to 
contend with; the presidential election was coming up in a few months. 
Already the opposition party, led by former President Sam Houston, was 
attacking the administration for its total dependence on a loan to bring 
financial stability instead of using a policy of retrenchment. 
Taking heed of the public's demand for reduced expenditures, the 
Lamar administration began reviewing its programs, cutting back on many 
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and eliminating those no longer needed. Appropriations were drastically 
reduced. The Army's appropriations were cut back.to only $111,050, as 
compared to $1,056,369, the previous year. The Republic's population 
had grown, particularly on the frontier, to where a large standing army 
was no longer needed to provide the settlers with defense against the 
Indians. The naval expenditures were also cut deeply, no new ships were 
being built. Altogether, naval appropriations totaled $100,000, 
$~52,000 less than the year before. Miscellaneous appropriations were 
less than twenty-eight per cent of the previous year's. Only in appro-
priations for the Congress was there an increase over the preceding 
year, $95,000 versus $68,150. Total classified appropriations for the 
entire year would amount to $695,330 or $1,669,369 less than the year 
before, the high water mark in appropriations for the Lamar administra-
t . 1 l.On. Even though it was necessary to ini ti.ate the retrenchment pro-
gram, the Lamar administration still refused to believe the loan would 
not soon be completed. Neither did it be1lieve the Mexican Government 
would continue to refuse to negotiate. 
But the Mexican Government did continue its policy of refusing to 
negotiate with Texas, or to accept mediation by the British Government. 
Shortly after the Fifth Texas Congress had convened the previous 
November, the news of Treat's failure in Mexico was received. Lamar 
recommended to Congress that Texas raise a force sufficient to compel 
Mexico to recognize the independence of Texas. Acting on this recom-
mendation, the Texas Hou~e passed a resolution instructing a committee 
to inquire into the matter. On December fifth, the Senate notified the 
1Miller, A Financial History of Texas, p. 391· 
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President it had also appointed a committee to act with the House com-
mittee in considering the possibility of war with Mexico. At this time, 
Lamar became ill and it was necessary for him to travel to New Orleans 
for treatment. David G. Burnet, the Vice President, became Acting 
President. He continued to urge the Congress to take action on provid-
. f t . d M . 2 1ng a orce o 1nva e ex1co. 
On January twelfth, the House committee submitted its report. The 
report discussed in detail the poverty of the Republic and advised 
against an offensive war with Mexico. However, the report did recommend 
Texas should be prepared to repel an invasion. Shortly thereafter, the 
two Houses failed to agree on an appropriation bill for the regular 
army, and the army was disbanded, leaving the Republic without means of 
defense. 3 
In the meantime, Hamilton had submitted another progress report on 
the loan. The money market was still under severe pressure in England, 
Hamilton informed Burnet. Furthermore, France and several other 
European countries were about to enter the market for large loans. In 
fact, he continued, loans of any type were difficult to obtain, and not 
even one American loan had been negotiated in Europe this past year. 
All this activity on the money markets had pushed the interest rates up, 
and the interest rate for the best English securities was six per cent, 
the highest in years. As for the loan's chances, he had been told by 
bankers, both in England and on the continent, no loan could be nego-
tiated, or an advance received against Texas bonds, so long as there 
2christian, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, pp. 153-15~. 
3Ibid., pp. 153-15~-
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was a possibility of aggressive action by Texas against Mexico. There-
fore, the prompt ratification of the Mediation Treaty should have a 
favorable effect, since this would prevent Texas from moving against 
Mexico until the British Government had an opportunity to discuss with 
the Mexican Government the many advantages of its recognizing the inde-
pendence of Texas. Palmerston also concurred with these views, Hamilton 
noted, and had suggested the advisability of the Republic of Texas 
having a plenipotentiary near Mexico, in case the Mexican Government 
decided to accept mediation by the British Government. As to who this 
person should be, Palmerston had also made a recommendation. He called 
attention to the fact that Burnley was present in all discussions with 
the English bondholders as well as all other negotiations, and suggested 
he quite possibly would be the best qualified person for the assignment. 
In this Hamilton agreed heartily. 4 
Meanwhile, the two treaties of Amity, Navigation, and Commerce, 
and Mediation arrived in Texas and were promtply ratified by the Texas 
Senate on January twenty-fifth. 5 The treaties were then returned to 
England and Hamilton attempted to exchange ratifications with 
Palmerston. But Palmerston continued to insist the African Slave Trade 
Treaty must also be returned before ratifications could be exchanged. 
Hamilton had hoped the British Government would go ahead and recognize 
Texas, thus making Texas bonds valid securities on the British money 
markets, but this was not the case. 
The African Slave Trade Treaty was dispatched to Texas with 
4Hamilton to Lamar, January 25, 1841, DC, I, pp. 926-929. 
5christian, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, p. 154. 
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Burnley. Burnley was returning to Texas in case he was selected as the 
plenipotentiary to Mexico. En route to Texas in late January, he 
stopped in New York, and while there, wrote Secretary of the Treasury 
James Starr of his intention to visit Philadelphia before coming to 
Texas. The purpose of his visit to Philadelphia was two fold. First, 
he hoped to persuade the United States Bank at Philadelphia to guarantee 
an advance on the Texas bonds Hamilton was attempting to sell in Europe. 
Second, once the guarantee was obtained, he hoped the bank would advance 
one-half million dollars, the amount Hamilton was attempting to raise 
from the sale of Texas bonds, which he would bring to Texas. As for the 
bank, Burnley continued, it already had a considerable investment in the 
success of the loan negotiations, or any advance made by European capi-
talists, therefore, should be quite willing to make the guarantee. Once 
again, Burnley cautioned Starr the loan prospects rose and fell as the 
chance of war between Mexico and Texas incrased or diminished. Also, 
several English banking houses were much interested in the loan, pro-
vided they could be assured of peace between Mexico and the Republic of 
6 Texas. 
So strongly did Hamilton and Burnley believe an advance would be 
received on the loan that Burnley wrote Acting President Burnet that he 
expected to find letters waiting for him in New Orleans, authorizing him 
to draw an advance on the loan. As for peace with Mexico, both he and 
Hamilton did not see how the Mexican Government could withstand much 
longer the pressure from the British Government and the English bond-
holders1 and would soon accept mediation. Once peace was assured, there 
6 Burnley to Starr, January 25, 18~1, TTPl II~ p. 58~. 
8~ 
was little question of the loan being completed within the next thirty 
days. In fact, Burnley was highly confident Hamilton would obtain an 
advance, if Texas only promised to ratify the mediation treaty and to 
d . . t t M . ? sen a m1n1s er o ex1co. 
When Burnley arrived in New Orleans, he found no word from Hamilton 
waiting for him. Neither had he brought one~half million dollars with 
him from Philadelphia, the bank had decided to make no further conces-
sions. Burnley decided to wait in New Orleans for word from Hamilton 
and dispatched the African Slave Trade Treaty on to Texas. Like 
Hamilton, he was afraid of the reception the treaty would receive from 
the Texas Senate, and suggested that if a special session was called to 
ratify the treaty, the general public should not be informed of its 
contents until after the Senate met. Attempting to justify Hamilton's 
actions, Burnley pointed out that Hamilton felt it was necessary to 
agree to this treaty as the British Government had to have assurance 
the abolitionists in parliament would not attempt to blo~r€cognition 
of the Republic of Texas. 8 
The African Slave Trade Treaty did not arrive in Texas until after 
Congress had adjourned for the summer. Lamar could have called the 
Texas Senate into special session to ratify the treaty, as he was autho-
rized to do under Article VI, Section VII, of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Texas. 9 But Hamilton, fearing that many members of the 
7Burnley to Burnet; February 21, 18~1, DC, I, pp. 9J1-9JJ. 
8Ibid., P• 935· 
9Gammel. The Laws£!. Texas, 1822-1897, I, P• 16. 
Senate would misunderstand his actions on such a touchy subject as 
slavery, repeatedly asked that no special session be called to consider 
the treaty until he could be present to defend his actions. The 
African Slave Trade Treaty was vital to the sale of Texas bonds in 
England, yet he was reluctant to allow the treaty to be considered, 
even though its wordage success.fully avoided the issue of slavery. In 
agreeing to Hamilton's wishes, Lamar also prevented any consideration of 
the treaty until the Sixth Congress convened in November. By that time, 
it was too late for the treaty to help the Lamar administration. 
Lamar had returned to Texas during the middle of February. In his 
absence, the first two treaties with Great Britain had been ratified. 
Also, the Texas Congress had refused to appropriate the funds needed to 
maintain the regular army, thereby terminating the possibility of any 
immediate offensive actions by Texas against Mexico. This action had 
eased the threat of war and increased the chances for mediation, and 
possibly loans. In line with Palmerston's recommendations, Lamar began 
making preparations for another mission to Mexico. On March twenty-
second, James Webb, the Attorney General, was appointed Minister 
Plenipotentiary to Mexico. In case he was not received as minister, he 
was also appointed Agent for the purpose of entering into negotiations 
for peace and recognition. Webb received the same instructions as had 
Bee and Treat 1 peace, recognition afthe independence of Texas, and that 
Texas was willing to pay up to five million dollars for the land between 
the Rio Grande and the Nueces River. Also, additional instructions were 
given regarding the convention with Great Britain for mediation. 10 
iOCh. t" Mi .b B t L 155 
. ris 1an, ra eau uonapar e amar, p. • 
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Webb arrived off Vera Cruz the thirty-first of May, asked for per-
mission to land, and wanted to be furnished with passports to proceed 
to Mexico City. But the Mexican Government was unwilling to begin 
negotiations with Texas, and he was refused permission to land. Webb 
then wrote to Pakenham, requesting him to intercede with the Mexican 
authorities. Pakenham wrote the Secretary of State, Camacho, who re-
plied on June eighth, that the President refused to change his stand on 
the principles of honor and justice, therefore, he had no inclination 
to consider a proposal that would in any way cause a dismemberment of 
the Mexican nation. Webb then returned to Texas the last of June, and 
reported his failure to Lamar. 11 Thus, the third attempt by the Lamar 
administration to effect peace with Mexico also ended in failure. 
Mexico still refused to recognize the independence of Texas, the one 
thing nearly everyone conceded would bring about the much needed loan. 
In the meantime, Burnley had remained in New Orleans waiting for 
word from Hamilton, but Hamilton had decided nothing further could be 
done on the loan in England at this time, and had gone to France to 
take charge of the negotiations there. Negotiations for a loan had been 
going on for some time with the French Government. Henderson had dis-
cussed limitedly the possibility of a loan when he first visited Paris 
in August, 1838, seeking recognition from the French Government. 
Shortly thereafter, , the 1French Gbvernment ordered Count Alphonso de 
Saligny, private secretary to the French Minister in Washington, sent 
to Texas. Saligny was to investigate and report on political and 
economic conditions in the Republic of Texas, giving the French 
11Ibid. 
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Government data on which to base its decision regarding recognizing 
Texas. His report led to France recognizing the Republic of Texas on 
September 25, 1839. In the spring of 18~, Hamilton visited France for 
the first time to assess loan prospects in the French capital. Although 
he was unable to find any firm willing to make the loan, J. LaFitte and 
Company, a leading Paris bank, did express an interest in the loan. 
When Hamilton returned to Paris in February 18~1, .he immediately con-
tacted the J. LaFitte and Company. This time the company was willing to 
make the loan and on February fourteenth, a contract was concluded for 
a loan. All that remained was the assurance, or guarantee, by the 
French Government required on all foreign loans in France, to J. LaFitte 
12 
and Company, and Texas would have her loan. 
While waiting for the French Government to provide the assurance, 
Hamilton wrote John Chambers, now Secretary of the Treasury. Hamilton 
was greatly concerned over the harsh terms of the loan contract and felt 
it necessary to explain his actions. He pointed out that fifty cents on 
the dollar was a very low rate. Still, when the present state of Texas 
securities was considered, and the price of American stocks on the 
London and Paris markets, Texas would be receiving a high rate on her 
bonds. Furthermore 1 at the worst, Texas would be receiving three and 
one-half million against a loan of seven million dollars. Hamilton was 
trying to negotiate a loan two million dollars in excess of his authori-
zation. No doubt he believed this point would be overlooked if the 
t . . 13 nego 1at1ons were successful. 
12schmidt, Texas Statecraft, 1836~18~5, P• 153. 
13Hamilton to Secretary, March 7, 18~1, TTP, II, pp. 600-601. 
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Hamilton once again brought up the subject of a national bank. 
Through the use of a national bank, based on sound principles and 
properly managed, Hamilton continued, the Republic could issue new 
treasury notes that would be fiscally sound. In fact,.with the three 
and one-half million in specie, there was no reason why such an insti-
tution could not issue up to seven million in notes on a sound finan-
cial basis. But should the Texas Government use any other method of 
handling the money received from the loan, the money would go the way 
of all other Texas money, and in a short time, no more than three years 
t t t T ld . b b . 14 J t t a he mos , exas wou again e orrowing money. ust wha he 
Republic of Texas should do about the nearly three and one-half million 
dollars worth to treasury notes already in circulation, Hamilton made 
no comment. 
When the news of the loan reached Texas, excitement ran high. 
There was much talk about what Texas would do with the money and the 
benefits to be derived from a national bank. Not everyone favored the 
loani however. Houston came out against it and vowed the loan would 
never enter the country. Once the excitement died down, people began 
reassessing the possible value of the loan •. By midsummer, when the 
actual provisions of the loan were made known, public sentiment reversed 
itself and became opposed to the loan. Many in Texas considered five 
million acres of public land too high a price to pay. 15 Just what would 
have been the final outcome had the loan gone through is problematical, 
but the assurance needed from the French Government was never received 
14Ibid., pp. 600-601. 
15Mayfield to Lamar, April 6, 1841, Lamar Papers, III, p. 520. 
by J. LaFitte and Company, and the company withdrew its offer. 
Notwithstanding the lack of a guarantee from the French Government, 
Hamilton continued to carry on negotiations with J. LaFitte and Company, 
hoping it would decide to go ahead without the guarantee. Finally, 
realizing the company would not do so, he returned to England. Lord 
Aberdeen was now the Minister of Foreign Affairs, replacing Palmerston 
in a change of government. Hamilton had several conferences with 
Aberdeen, attempting to obtain still another treaty from Great Britain 
that would link the two countries in close trade relations. He offered 
preferential trade concessions on various imports and ship timber from 
the Texas forests. Hamilton also pointed to the renewed interest in 
Texas for annexation, and the advisability of prompt action by Great 
Britain to prevent this. But all was to no avail, for on October 
fourth, Aberdeen informed Hamilton the British Government would under 
no circumstances di.scuss any further propositions until such time as the 
16 African Slave Trade Treaty ratification was returned to England. 
By now, Hamilton was trying desperately to obtain a loan wherever 
and under whatever conditions possible. He had received word of the 
failure of Webb 1 s mission to Mexico. He had also been advised of the 
growing unrest in Texas, that public meetings were being held and war 
speeches heard daily. All this added further urgency to his efforts, 
for if Texas was to have her loan, negotiations must be completed prior 
' 17 to any aggressive action by Texas or Mexico. 
Hamilton lost no time in opening negotiations with Belgium. He 
16schmidt~ Texas Statecraft, 1836-1845, pp. 161~162. 
17Roberts to Hamilton, July 5, 1841, DC, I, P• 94o. 
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offered the usual preferential advantages of one~half the regular duties 
and added the privilege of coastwise trade. As was usual, land was 
pledged as security. In return, Belgium was to extend a thirty-seven 
million franc loan. Instead of attempting to negotiate a treaty, 
Hamilton recommended to Belgium an agent be sent to Texas to study con-
ditions and the possible advantages to Belgium of signing a treaty with 
the Republic of Texas. On October twenty-second, Belgium sent an agent 
to Texas. Just prior to the agent's departure, Hamilton made his final 
offer, adding a complete and absolute cession of a large tract of land 
if Belgium would guarantee a loan. He then boarded the same ship that 
was carrying the Belgian agent to Texas. Hamilton was at last returning 
to Texas to explain to the Senate his reasons for signing the African 
18 Slave Trade Treaty. 
Before Hamilton arrived in Texas, events there had changed all 
this. The presidential election was over and Houston was president once 
again. The new Congress was also controlled by Houston's party and had 
begun curtailing or eliminating the Lamar administration's programs. 
By early December, a joint committee on finance had spoken out against 
the loan. The committee contended that Texas could never support so 
large a loan and furthermore, that Congress could not ask the Texas 
citizens to assume so large a burden. Also, the threat to independence 
that had existed at the time the loan law was passed no longer existed, 
thus, the loan was no longer needed. Besides, the committee continued, 
the commissioners profit for negotiating the loan, ten per cent, was 
excessive. The committee then concluded its report, pointing out that, 
18schmitz~ Texas Statecraft, 1836-18~5, pp. 162-163. 
'For six long years the prospects of this loan has gone 
before us as a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night, 
and with all submissiveness we have followed its guidance 
with the vain hope that it would guide us to the borders 
of the promised land. But experience has manifested that 
the light which lured us shone only to betray. It has led 
us on from year to year, with hopes ever bright and assur-
ance ever strong of its speedy success;-~that with its 
success the financial millenium would begin; that upon it 
hinged the prosperity of Texas, and that it would be the 
dawn of brighter days and brighter things for the country. 
But these hopes have been, and under every contingency must 
be deceived; these expectations must forever be disappoint-
ed. Why cherish them longer? ••• The pending of this 
negotiation has been a curse;~-its success would be a 
greater curse still •••• The only way to avoid the evil, 
is to abandon the measure. •- 19 
91 
Acting upon recommendations of the joint committee on finance, the Texas 
Congress repealed the act authorizing the loan. On January 26, 1842, 
Anson Jones, Secretary of State for the new administration, notified 
Hamilton of the loan act's repeal, and :that his commission as loan com-
.. hd . d 20 missioner a expire. Fortunately for Hamilton, his recall did not 
reach him until he was in Texas of his own accord, sparing him some 
embarrassment. He had labored long and hard for the Lamar administra-
tion, but was unable to obtain the five million dollar loan both he and 
the administration thought would solve the financial difficulties of the 
Republic of Texas. 
Thus, the Lamar administration ended its three years in office. It 
had been unable to achieve its primary goal of financial stability for 
the Republic of Texas. It handed over to the incoming administration a 
republic much more heavily burdened with debt. In three years, the 
public debt had increased from $1,886,425 to $7,446 1 740, while the value 
l9Ibid., p. 164-165. 
20 Jones to Hamilton, January 25, 1.842, DC, 1 9 pp. 943=944. 
of Texas money had depreciated from eighty cents on the dollar to, at 
best, no more than fifteen cents, and in some parts of Texas as low as 
three and four cents on the dollar. During these same three years, 
expenditures had exceeded revenues by $3,771,492, well within the five 
million dollars the Republic was trying to borrow. Yet a loan would 
have by no means corrected the Republic's finances owing to the amount 
21 
of paper money in circulatiori--in excess of four million dollars. 
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21Miller, A Financial History .2f. Texas, p. 391; Gouge, The Fiscal 
History .2f. Texas, p. 268; Hoover, 11Asbhel Smith on Currency and Finance 
in the Republic of Texas, 11 p. 423. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The Lamar administration began its term of office with the knowl-
edge that the Republic of Texas needed a large loan in order to have 
financial stability. Lamar was so confident this loan would be quickly 
contracted that he immediately initiated his domestic program, which 
called for spending large amounts of money. Thus, while the adminis-
tration waited for the loan's procurement, the Republic's debts in-
creased and its chances of financial stability decreased. 
When Lamar's administration took office in December 1838, the 
public debt was $1,886,~25; moreover, only $68~,069 in treasury notes, 
worth eighty cents on the dollar, were in circulation. One year later, 
the public debt stood at $3,855,900 and an additional $1,329,693 in 
treasury notes were in circulation. During that year, the value of 
treasury notes dropped nearly sixty per cent, most of this in the last 
half of the year. The expanded domestic program resulted in governmen-
tal expenditures exceeding revenues by $1,316,382. But during the same 
time, the Republic's exports.increased by nearly one hundred thousand 
1 dollars, while imports decreased by twice that amount. 
There was a time in'the early months of the Lamar administration 
when a five million dollar loan, judiciously administered, possibly 
1Miller, A Financial History of Texas, p. 391, Gouge, The Fiscal 
History of Tex;s, p .• 269. 
9Li: 
could have given the Republic of Texas financial stability. In fact, 
the value of treasury notes did not begin to depreciate drastically 
until after July, 1839, when they were still worth fifty cents on the 
dollar. This depreciation was due, in part, to the $1,569,010 of addi-
tional treasury notes printed since the first of the year, notes printed 
in anticipation of a loan. 2 After that time, the rapid expansion of 
printed money, money printed without sound backing, the continuing im-
balance in foreign trade, and the large amount of government expendi-
tures made it highly doubtful that a subsequent loan could have brought 
financial stability. Nevertheless, the Lamar administration continued 
to try to obtain a loan. 
In spite of the administration's best efforts, the loan was never 
obtained. Lamar and his loan commissioners labored long and hard, but 
they were unable to cope with the pressures on British foreign policy. 
These pressures prevented the Republic of Texas from procuring a loan 
from British banking interests. 
Recognition by the British Government as an independent nation was 
the key to British banking interests and to the loan. James Freshfield, 
Solicitor for the Bank of England, had pointed this out to Hamilton and 
Burnley in October 18li:O.. Once recognition was granted, the way was 
open to finalize negotiations with a British bank. Several banks had 
expressed an interest in the loan, once Texas was recognized and the 
threat of war between Mexico and Texas had passed. Therefore, if Texas 
was to have a loan, it h.ad. to find a way to convince the British Govern-
ment of the advantages connected with granting recognition to the 
2Gouge, The Fiscal History of Texas, pp. 268-269. 
Republic of Texas. But there was little Texas could do, for Great 
Britain needed few Texas products at this time. In a few years, Texas 
could be a major supplier of cotton for the English mills, but at the 
moment Texas was primarily a market for manufactured goods. The pres-
sures for recognition, then, had to come from other sources. 
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There were many issues that affected British foreign policy and 
contributed to its delay in recognizing the Republic of Texas~ the 
possibility of war with France, unrest in the Canadian colonies, a 
boundary dispute with the United States, a dispute between Mexico and 
Texas, the possible loss of trade and influence in the Caribbean region 
with the immediate recognition of the Republic of Texas, the continued 
refusal of Mexico to negotiate with Texas to accept mediation by the 
British Government, the financial condition of the Bank of England, the 
African slave trade and slavery in Texas, and the external and internal 
pressures associated with these issues. While there was no one issue by 
itself that can be called the key issue, there were three issues that 
can be considered vital: (1) the African slave trade and slavery in 
Texas, (2) the continuing refusal of Mexico to negotiate with Texas or 
accept the British Government as mediator, and (J) the financial con-
dition of the Bank of England. 
1he African slave trade and slavery in Texas were major obstacles 
to recognition. The anti-slavery block in the British Parliament had 
been responsible for Great Britain concluding thirty-one treaties. 
Barlow Hoy, the leader· of the anti-slavery group, brought up the ques-
tion of slave trade and slavery in Texas as early as 1835. At that 
time, Palmerston had expressed doubts regarding the existence of African 
slave trade in Texas and hadpassedover the issue of slavery, leaving 
this to be discussed at a later date. The Texas position on these 
issues was explained to Palmerston by Henderson in 1837. Henderson 
admitted that some of the emigrants from the United States had brought 
slaves with them. However, the Constitution of the Republic of Texas 
prohibited the importation of slaves from any part of the world except 
the United States. Furthermore, the First Congress had passed a law 
imposing the death penalty on anyone importing a slave from any other 
part of the world. 3 This explanation did not satisfy the anti=slavery 
forces; they demanded that Texas ratify an African Slave Trade Treaty 
before Great Britain would consider extending recognition. This treaty 
alone held up the recognition of Texas for more than a year. There was 
no way that Texas could avoid signing this treaty, for recognition and 
the loan were unavailable without it. 
The continued refusal of Mexico to negotiate with Texas or accept 
mediation from the British Government also delayed recognition of Texas 
by the British Government. Palmerston would have much preferred Mexico 
to recognize the independence of Texas before the British Government. 
This way, there would be no question of Great Britain retaining its 
present commercial interests in the Caribbean. Neither would her influ-
ence in the region be diminished in any way. In fact, such an action by 
the Mexican Government would lead to greater trade and influence in the 
Caribbean for Great Britain. Both Texas and Mexico would provide bar-
riers to further aggression by the United States into the Southwest. 
This thinking was evidenced in Palmerston's instructions to Pakenham in 
April 1839, when he pointed out that Mexico should change to a foreign 
3Henderson to Irion, January 5, 1838, DC, I, p. 81±1. 
policy based on Texas providing a barrier state to further aggression 
by the United States into the Southwest.4 
But Mexico refused to change its foreign policy despite pressure 
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from the British Government, and the English bondholders. Camacho, the 
Mexican Secretary of State, reaffirmed this position in June 1841, when 
he informed Pakenham the Mexican President would listen to no proposal 
that would in any way dismember the Mexican nation. 5 This stand pre-
vented mediation by the British Government, just as it prevented nego-
tiations with any of the three missions Lamar sent to Mexico. By 
Palmerston preferring to use this approach, he delayed recognition of 
Texas many months. Not until he was fully convinced that Mexico would 
not change its stand did he change British foreign policy and offer 
treaties to Texas, which when ratified, meant recognition by the 
British Government. 
The financial condition of the Bank of England was also another 
barrier to Texas recognition and its loan. The fact that the Bank of 
England would not recognize Texas,bonds as valid securities until the 
British Government had recognized Texas, prevented English banks from 
extending the loan. But there is another as equally important reason. 
When Hamilton was in England attempting to contract the loan in 1839, 
the Bank of England was nearly bankrupt. The bad crops the previous 
year and the mismanagement of the bank's directors had reduced the 
bank's reserves well below the safety point. Even if Hamilton had con-
tracted the loan, and recognition been given, it is highly unlikely the 
4 
. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1836-1846, 
PP• 29-J1. 
5christian, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, p. 155. 
bank's directors, or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would have con-
sented to five million dollars worth of specie being removed from the 
bank's vaults. It must be kept in mind the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
is responsible for seeing the Bank of England had the necessary funds on 
hand for operating the British Government. William Pitt, as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, had halted the bank's paying specie, internally, in 
6 
1797, when its reserves reached a critical point. There is little 
doubt such an action would be taken once again, if necessary. Thus, 
another pressure on British foreign policy for delaying the recognition 
of the Republic of Texas. At the time Hamilton was seeking a loan in 
1839, the five million dollars Texas was trying to borrow was slightly 
less than half the Bank of England's specie reserves. 
Texas had no means whereby it could bring pressure to bear on any 
of these issues. The anti-slavery forces in the British Parliament 
would accept no compromise on African slave trade. In the case of 
Mexico, Texas had made three attempts at peace, with all three rejected. 
It had offered inducements to the English bondholders, hoping they could 
bring enough pressure on the British Government as well as the Mexican 
Government so that peace could be achieved, but this, too, failed. 
Texas had agreed to pay a portion of the Mexican debt to England if the 
British Government could effect mediation with Mexico, but this was an 
agreement not a pressure. Only when Texas threatened to renew offensive 
action against Mexico did ft cause any concern. But this had a negative 
effect, it frightened off potential lenders in England. The financial 
condition of the Bank of England was an internal issue for England, 
6sir John Clapham, The Bank£!: England, II (New York, 1945), II, 
P• 1. 
still it affected the Republic of Texas' bid for recognition at a time 
when financial stability was still a reasonable possibility for the 
Republic. Here again, Texas had no way of influencing decisions made 
regarding this issue. 
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There is, however, a factor which must be added to all these 
issues that also contributed to the delay in recognition--time. Time 
had one meaning to the Lamar administration and another to Palmerston 
and the British Government. To the Lamar administration, time was a 
critical factor, it had only three years in which to achieve all its 
goals. To Palmerston and the British Government, time meant the amount 
of time necessary to carry out British foreign policy. Here time was 
frequently measured in years, even decades. Thus, when the Lamar 
administration was attempting to cope with the pressures on British 
foreign policy, it was also fighting time. 
Palmerston had applied the time factor when Henderson sought recog-
nition in 1837. He stated that the British Government needed more time 
in which to make its decision and.to see if Mexico was capable of re~ 
taking Texas. Again in his instructions to Pakenham in 1839, time was 
involved. The lengthy. attempts at convincing Mexico to recognize the 
independence of Texas and the repeated attempts to persuade Mexico to 
accept mediation all took time, time that the British Government had 
but not the Lamar administration. Even after Palmerston decided to 
recognize the Republic of Texas, he took many months before offering to 
negotiate the three treaties. 
At no time was there any indication that Palmerston ever acted 
in haste; neither was there any reason for him to do so. Great Britain 
had power and influence and time was on its side. The Republic of Texas 
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had neither power nor influence; for the Lamar administration, time ran 
out. For three years the Lamar administration tried but was unable to 
find a way to circumvent the pressures on British foreign policy that 
prevented recognition and the loan. 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources 
Adams, Ephriam Douglass, ed. British Diplomatic Correspondence Concern-
ing the Republic of Texas, 1836-1846. Austin: Texas State 
Historical Association, 1917. 
Binkley, William Ca, edm Official Correspondence of the Texas Revolu-
tion, 1835-1836. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 
1936. 
Connor, Seymour V., ed. The Texas Treasury Papers. 3 vols. Austin: 
Texas State Historical Association, 1955. 
DC. See Garrison, George P., ed. "Diplomatic Correspondence. 
" 
Gammel, H.P. N., ed. The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897~ 10 vols. Austin: 
The Gammel Book Company, 1898. vols. 1 and 2. 
Garrison, George P., 
Texasa 11 Annual 
1908. 3 vols. 
ed. "Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of 
Report of the American Historical Association for 
Washington-:--GPO, 1908-1911. 
Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons). 
3rd series, vol. 35. 
Gulick, Charles Adam Jr., and Winnie Allen, eds. The Papers of 
Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar. 6 vols. Austin: Von Boeckman-Jones 
Co., 1924-1928m 
Ireland. Irish University Press Seriesa Parliamentary Papers (Slave 
Trade). volsa 20, 21, and 24. 
Jones, Anson. Memoranda and Official Correspondence Relating 
Republic of Texas~ History and Annexation, 1836-1845. 
Chicago: The Rio Grande Press, 1966. 
TTP. See Connor, Seymour v., ed. The Texas Treasury Papers. 
to the 
Secondary Sources 
Books 
Adams, Ephriam Douglass$ British Interests and Activities in Texas, 
1836-1846. Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1963. 
102 
Andreades, A0 History of the Bank of England. New York: Augustus M. 
Kelly, 19660 
Bagehot, Walter. Lombard Street~ Description of the Money Market. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. 
Bancroft, Hubert Ha History of the North Mexican States and Texas. 
2 vols. San Francisco: The History Company, 1889. 
Bell, Herbert C. F. Lord Palmerston® 2 vols. Hamden, Connecticut: 
Archon Books, 1966. 
Billington, Ray Allen. The Far Western Frontier 1830-1860. New York: 
Harper, 1956. 
Binkley, William Ce The Expansion Movement in Texas, 1836-1850. 
Berkley: University of California Press, 1925. 
Bisschop, W.R. The Rise of the London Money Market, 1640-1826. 
New York: Augustus M:-Kelly, 1968. 
Bourne, Kenneth. Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 
1815-1908. Berkley: Univ";;sity of California"""press, 1967. 
Christian, Asa Kyrus. Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar. Austin: Texas State 
Historical Association, 1922. 
Clapham, Sir Johna ~ Bank of England, A History. 2 vols. New York: 
The Macmillian Company, 1945. 
Connor, Seymour v. Adventure In Glory. Austin: Steck-Vaughn Company, 
1965. 
Gambrell, Herbert. Anson Jones: The Last President of Texas. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1964. ~~ 
Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar: Troubadour and Crusader. Dallas: 
Southwest Press, 1934. 
Garrison, George P. Westward Extension. New York: Harper and Brother, 
1906. 
Giuseppi, John0 The Bank of England. London: Evans Brothers Limited, 
1966. 
103 
Gouge, William M. The Fiscal History of Texas; Embracing~ Account of 
its Revenue, Debts, and Currency, From the Commencement of the 
Revolution in 1834 to 1851-52. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, 
and Company-,-1852. -
Graham, Phillip. The Life and Poems of Mirabeau B. Lamar. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1938. 
Hawtrey, R. G. A Century of Bank Rates. New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 
19620 
Hildreth, Richard. The History of Banks. New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 
1968. 
Hill, Jim Dan. 
Diplomacy. 
The Texas Navy in Forgotten Battles and Shirtsleeve 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946. 
Hogan, William Ransom. 
History. Norman: 
The Texas Republic: A Social and Economic 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1946. 
Miller, Edmund T. ! Financial History of Texas. (Bulletin No. 37 of 
the University of Texas, July 1, 1916.) Austin: A. C. Baldwin and 
Sons, 1916. 
Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Oxford History of the American People. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 
Nance, Joseph Milton. After San Jacinto: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 
1836-1841@ Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964. 
Newton, Lewis William and Herbert Pickens Gambrell. Texas Yesterday and 
Today with the Constitution (1528-1948). Dallas: Turner Company, 
1948. 
Postgate, Raymond Williams and Aylmer Vallance. England Goes to Press: 
The English Peoples Opinion of Foreign Affairs, 1815-1937. 
New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1937. 
Pratt, Julius W. A History of United States Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. 
Englewood Cliffs, Newl·Jersey: Prent ice-Hall, Inc. , 1965. 
Reeves, Jesse S. American Diplomacy Under Tyler~ Polk. Gloucester, 
Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1967. 
Rives, -George L. The United States~ Mexico, 1821-1846. 2 vols. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913. 
Schmidt, Joseph William. Texas Statecraft, 1836-1845. San Antonio: 
Naylor Company, 1941. 
Siegel, Stanley" ! Political History of the Texas Republic, 1836-1845. 
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1956. 
104 
Smith, Ashbela Reminiscenses of the Texas Republic. Galveston: 
Historical Society of Galveston, 1876. 
Smith, Justin H. The Annexation of Texas. 2 vols. New York: Barnes 
and Noble, Inc., 1941. 
Temperley, Harold and Lillian M. Penson. Foundation of British Foreign 
Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902). New York: Barnes and 
Noble, Inc., 1966. 
Wallace, Ernest and David M. Vigness. Documents of Texas History. 
Austin: Steck Company, 1963. 
Ward, Sir A. W. and G. P. Gooch. The Cambridge History of British 
Foreign Policy. 3 vols. New York: The Macmillian Company, 1922. 
Wood, Elmer. English Theories of Central Banking Control, 1819-1858. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. 
Yoakum, H. History of Texas from its First Settlement 
Annexation to the United States in 1846. 2 vols. 
J. S. Redfield~855. - --
Articles 
in 1685 to its 
New York: 
Barker, Eugene C. "The Finances of the Texas Revolution."· Political 
Science Quarterly, XIX, No. 4 (1904), 614-634. 
Christian, Asa Kyrus. "Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar." Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, XXIII (April, 1920), 227-244. 
Edwards, Herbert Rook& "Diplomatic Relations between France and the 
Republic of Texas." Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XX 
(April, 1917), 225-229. 
Hoover, Herbert T. 11Ashbel Smith on Currency and Finance in the 
Republic of Texas." Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LXXXI 
(January, 1968), 420-421. 
Worley, J. L. "The Diplomatic Relations of England and the Republic .of 
Texas." Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XI (July, 1905), 13. 
Unpublished Materials 
Benkendorfer, Madie. "British Activities in Relation to the Independ-
ence of Texas." Unpublished Master's thesis, Southwest Texas State 
Teachers College, 1945. 
King, John Morrison. "English Interests in Texas 1810-1845. 11 
Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Clclahoma, 1935. 
105 
Ratliff, Lucile. "The Diplomatic Relations of Texas and Mexico, 1836-
1846.11 Unpublished Master's thesis, East Texas State Teachers 
College, 1939. 
VITA 
Henry Mathewson Winsor Jr. 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
Thesis: BRITISH LOAN ATTEMPTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF MIRABEAU 
BUONAPARTE LAMAR 
Major Field: History 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Dover, Kansas, September 16, 1918, the son 
of Mr. and Mrs. Henry M. Winsorm Married to the former 
Helen L. Bruce; one daughter and one son. 
Education: Attended public school in Dover, Kansas, and graduated 
from Dover Rural High School in May, 1936; received the 
Bachelor of Arts degree from Oklahoma State University in 
August, 1969; completed the requirements for the Master of 
Arts degree in History at Oklahoma State University in July, 
1973. 
Professional Experience: Retired from the United States Air Force 
in May, 1967, with twenty-three years service. Served in 
Europe during World War II, and in the Far East during the 
Korean War. Received the Bronze Star during the Korean War0 
